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THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975, AS AMENDED:
GENESIS AND SELECTED PROBLEM AREAS
HOWARD EGLIT*
Billions of dollars in federal moneys are distributed annually to
state and local governments, as well as nongovernmental entities, by
way of grants. These may be made in accordance with statutorily set
distribution formulas, allowing for little or no choice by the funding
agency either as to recipients or levels of funding. Grants may also be
distributed as discretionary allocations made by federal agencies which
are authorized by statute to fund different programmatic efforts, free of
statutory strictures setting either the identity of the grant recipients or
specific amounts to be received.'
The numbers and dollars involved in these federal grant programs
are enormous. At least ten federal agencies and twenty-two independ-
ent federal entities administer more than 700 programs involving the
distribution of grant moneys; the total annual disbursements approxi-
mate $100 billion.2 Given the extent of this grant system, it is hardly
surprising that Congress has imposed conditions on the receipt and use
of this federal financial assistance.3 Among these, statutory prohibi-
tions as to various forms of discrimination by recipients of such assist-
ance stand as critically important limitations.4 Title VI of the Civil
* Associate Professor, lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law; J.D., University of Chicago.
I. As to the various types of grants, see R. CAPPALLI, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER FED-
ERAL GRANTS 38-45 (1979).
2. In 1980, 10 federal agencies and 22 independent agencies administered 735 federal pro-
grams covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL: AGENCIES WHEN PROVIDING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE SHOULD
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VI, at 1 (April 15, 1980). This statute is the model for the
primary age discrimination law applicable to grantees, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 42
U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Thus, the same statistics would apply in the age
context. By virtue of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 (1981), a small number of block grant programs were established to replace a large number of
specific grant programs hitherto administered by the federal government. These block grants
transfer primary administrative responsibility to the states and confer substantial discretion on the
states as to the use of the grant funds.
3. "Federal financial assistance," for the purposes of the Age Discrimination Act, is defined
by the government-wide regulations promulgated by the then Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) to implement the Act. See,
e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 90.4 (1980). As to the supplanting of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare by the Department of Health and Human Services, see note 55 infra.
4. Federal agencies are, of course, empowered to set rules governing the receipt and use of
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Rights Act of 1964,5 which outlaws discrimination on the bases of race,
color and national origin, was the first such major nondiscrimination
statute limiting funding recipients. It in turn has served as the model
for bans on sex-based discrimination by educational institutions receiv-
ing federal financial assistance, 6 discrimination based on handicap,7
and age discrimination, a ban embodied in the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975, as amended.8
The ADA is the primary statutory vehicle devised by the Congress
to secure the amelioration of age discrimination perpetrated by recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance. 9 Almost four years in moving from
enactment to actual legal effect,' 0 the ADA purports to prohibit dis-
moneys by recipients of assistance. See generally Yamada, Rulemaking Requirements Related to
Federal Financial Assistance Programs, 39 FED. B.J. 89 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1686 (1976) (commonly referred to as Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978) (commonly referred to as § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the ADA or
the Act].
9. The ADA does not stand alone as the sole statutory limit on recipients of federal financial
assistance insofar as age discrimination is concerned. See, e.g., Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 823(a)(1), 834(a) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-524,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 1934, 1948 (1978); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C.
§ 1242(a)(1) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 8(a), 90 Stat. 2350 (1976); Urban Mass
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. III 1979); General Education Provisions Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1232i (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 407-408, 90 Stat. 2232-33 (1976);
Public Works Employment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6727 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-
30, § 605, 91 Stat. 166 (1977); Energy Conservation and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6870(a)
(1976); Disaster Relief Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5151, 5174 (1976).
The Legal Services Corporation, which considers itself not to be a distributor of federal
financial assistance, and therefore not.covered by the ADA, has issued proposed regulations gov-
erning age discrimination nonetheless. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,055 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R.
§ 1624). VISTA and Peace Corps, also not covered by the ADA, have issued proposed regulations
concerning this issue. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 1,608 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 1225).
The Department of Agriculture has also issued final regulations vis-A-vis direct beneficiaries of
federal assistance, who are not covered by the ADA. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.50-15.52 (1980).
10. The ADA was signed into law on November 28, 1975. The statute provided for its own
deferral, however, as its implementation was made contingent upon the occurrence of two subse-
quent events. First, the United States Commission on Civil Rights was mandated to conduct a
study to identify instances of age discrimination in federally funded programs and to then report
its findings and recommendations to Congress. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
Initially the Commission was given 18 months to perform this task. 42 U.S.C. § 6106(d) (1976)
(amended 1977). Congress later gave the Commission an additional six months to complete the
job. 42 U.S.C. § 6106(d) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-65, § 1, 91 Stat. 269 (1977).
Once the Commission so reported, the second event was to occur, ie., the promulgation of
model regulations by the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6103(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1978) [hereinafter referred to as HEW]. As to the supplanting of
HEW by the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services, see
note 55 infra. These model regulations were to serve as the prototype for the agency-specific
regulations which would then be issued by each individual federal agency. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4)
(1976) (amended 1978). The issuance dates for the general regulations and the agency-specific
regulations were keyed to the completion of the Commission study: the HEW-proposed model
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crimination on the basis of age, "1 with this prohibition applying across
the age spectrum so as to protect victims both young and old. ' 2 Loss or
denial of federal funds is the ultimate penalty imposed for transgres-
sion of the Act;13 agency administrative enforcement,14 private suits for
regulations could not be issued until, at the earliest, 90 days after receipt of the study by Congress
and the President. Furthermore, the final HEW regulations could not be issued for still another 90
days. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(2)(A) and (3) (1976).
Only after issuance of the HEW government-wide regulations could the individual agencies
proceed: they were to issue their regulations within 90 days after HEW's final issuance. In fact,
none did so. See Marlin, Enforcement of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 57 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 1049 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marlin]. Enhancing consistency, but further slowing down
the process, was the requirement added by a 1978 amendment to the ADA that each agency's
regulations had to be approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6103(a)(4) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(b)(l), 92 Stat. 1555 (1978).
Because of this extensive regulatory prescription set out in the statute, the 1975-passed law
was not, according to the original Act, to become effective until January 1, 1979, at the earliest. 42
U.S.C. § 6103(a)(5) (1976) (amended 1978). Subsequently, in 1978, the Act was amended to fur-
ther postpone the effective date of the statute until July 1, 1979. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(5) (1976), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(b)(2), 92 Stat. 1555 (1978).
In fact, HEW did not issue its final general regulations until June 12, 1979-a year and a half
after the Civil Rights Commission report had been transmitted to Congress in December, 1977.
See 45 C.F.R. § 90.1-90.62 (1980). These were preceded by two issuances. The first was a Notice
of Intent to Issue Age Discrimination Regulations, which identified what HEW deemed to be the
major issues to be addressed. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,756-58 (1978). Subsequently, the agency issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which provided an analysis of its proposed regulations, and in
certain instances presented alternatives as to which HEW sought public comments. 43 Fed. Reg.
56,428-46 (1978). The final regulations themselves were accompanied, when published in the Fed-
eral Register, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768-88 (1979), by an Overview and a Comment Analysis, neither of
which appears in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Several consequences follow from the only recent effective date of the Act, and from the
extensive regulations interpreting the statute. First, there is very little by way of direct case law
guidance, or even administrative enforcement experience, simply because the 1975 Act is in actu-
ality so new in terms of implementation. Second, an understanding of the Act requires careful
attention to the HEW government-wide regulations, since they stand as the model which every
federal agency must follow. Third, given the ambiguities of the statute, the HEW regulations are
particularly important, inasmuch as they supply substantive guidance and interpretation which
the statutory language and the scanty legislative history do not themselves otherwise provide.
Finally, the significance of the government-wide regulations, and the agency-specific regulations
modeled on them, is heightened by the very considerable deference which the courts will accord to
them. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (racial discrimination guidelines issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
11. The ADA provides in part:
[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976).
12. It is quite clear that the ADA was primarily motivated by a desire to deal with discrimi-
nation perpetrated against individuals deemed by federally funded programs as being too old for
participation. Nonetheless, the House Committee Report on the bill which ultimately was enacted
into law, H.R. REP. No. 94-67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975), and the statement of the House
manager of the bill on the floor during consideration of the Act, 121 CONG. REc. 9212 (1975)
(statement of Rep. Brademas), establish that the Act's scope extends to discrimination at any age,
a conclusion consonant with the language of the Act.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(a)(1) (1976).
14. Id. § 6104(a)(2).
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injunctive relief,' 5 and suits by the United States Attorney General' 6
are also encompassed within the statute's provisions.
Penalties and multiple enforcement mechanisms notwithstanding,
the ADA's reach actually is quite meager, for the statute is brigaded
with a series of exceptions from its general prohibition.17 These cut so
deeply as to warrant giving serious credence to the conclusion that the
Act actually may be a virtually useless device for effectively dealing
with age discrimination. ' 8 This aside, there are a number of other sig-
nificant conceptual and practical problems generated by the Act. Some
of these will be addressed in this paper; the remainder will be discussed
in successive papers in this symposium on the statute.
THE CONCEPTUAL AND FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT
Genesis
A persuasive case has been made that older people in America are
an identifiable, and at least sometimes victimized, minority group sub-
jected to various forms of deprivation, and deserving of special support
because of their physical, social and economic disadvantages. Twenty
years ago, one author concisely set out this theme:
In many respects the aged show characteristics of a minority group.
They are subject to categorical discrimination, they have relatively
high visibility, and, in many parts of our society, they constitute a
functioning subgroup. Stereotypes are held about the group, and in-
dividuals are judged thereby. Prejudice is not uncommon, especially
in industry, where persons over 40 are discriminated against in em-
ployment practices. Thus, the ingredients necessary to the develop-
ment of minority group status are present for the aged.' 9
There is of course considerable room for debate about the status of
the elderly in our society, even recognizing that they do constitute a
minority group. Some would contend that, given the particularly large
proportion of the federal budget allocated to entitlement and benefit
programs aimed at their problems, 20 the old are hardly a group prop-
15. Id. § 6104(e) (Supp. II 1979).
16. Id. § 6104(a)(2) (1976). See note 161 infra.
17. See generally Alexander, Schucking Of the Rights of the Aged- Congressional Ambiva-
lence and the Exceptions to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1009 (198 1)
[hereinafter cited as Alexander].
18. Id.
19. Breen, The Aging Individual, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 157 (C. Tibbitts
ed. 1960).
20. See, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ELDERLY,
COMM. PUB. No. 95-167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1979).
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erly viewed as the victims of adverse treatment. 2' But dollars, of
course, are not the sole benchmark of deprivation, and in any event it
can be argued that at least some of the dollar transfer from the young
to the old is itself a response to ageism, for this transfer would not be
necessary-or at least legislated-if society were more willing to allow
older men and women to continue working, rather than forcing them
into unwanted retirement and consequent dependence upon Social Se-
curity payments and various governmentally funded programs. In any
event, advocates for the aged assert that discrimination indeed does ex-
ist regardless of some benefits flowing in the direction of the elderly.
They focus on discrimination in employment; 22 limited access to pub-
licly funded transportation facilities whose bus steps and subway en-
trances cannot be negotiated by the often infirm older man or
woman;23 denial of credit to the old;24 under-representation in federally
funded mental health programs, job training programs and legal serv-
ices programs;25 pejorative depictions in the media;26 and so on.
Wherever the truth may lie, the fact is that by the mid- 1960s the
elderly were perceived as being both the objects of mistreatment and
the deserving recipients of official solicitude. Both in the courts and the
legislatures efforts were afoot by advocacy groups of growing influence
and increasing sophistication 27 to secure for the old a discrimination-
free environment. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196728 was Congress' first major response to this drive. The Age Dis-
crimination Act of 1975 was the second. Unlike the earlier statute,
however, the ADA is not confined to a defined age group-those aged
40 to 70; rather, it extends to persons of all ages from infancy through
21. It has been observed that the very success of the elderly in accumulating governmental
benefits and advantages presents a potential serious source of inter-generational conflict,
grounded on the jealousy and resentment of the younger, majoritarian group who are footing the
bill for these benefits through taxes and paycheck deductions, yet who are foreclosed by their
youth from present eligibility. See P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 49 (1976); H. SHEP-
PARD & S. Rix, THE GRAYING OF WORKING AMERICA 32 (1977).
22. The federal government has addressed this problem by enactment of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
23. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., TRAVEL BARRIERS (1970).
24. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
25. These programs, and their underserving of the elderly, are discussed in the U. S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY (1977) [hereinafter cited as AGE DISCIMI-
NATION STUDY], the study undertaken pursuant to the mandate of the ADA. See notes 49-54 and
accompanying text mfra.
26. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, AGE STEREOTYPING AND TELEVISION, COMM.
PuB. No. 95-109, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
27. As to the political power and efforts of seniors generally, see H. PRATT, THE GRAY
LOBBY (1976).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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death: a benefit for the young apparently derived from a spillover of
heightened age discrimination consciousness on the part of the legisla-
tors.
29
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196430 was the acknowledged
prototype for the ADA. Indeed, the prohibition and enforcement sec-
tions of the two statutes are virtually identical. Few would dispute that
in enacting Title VI, designed to combat discrimination on the bases of
race, color and national origin by recipients of federal financial assist-
ance, 3' Congress had solid factual basis for concluding that the dis-
crimination addressed indeed existed. More than that, a history of de
jure segregation throughout the southern states left no doubt that race
discrimination was endemic rather than aberrational. The case for es-
tablishing that age discrimination was being perpetrated by recipients
of federal financial assistance was a far less well documented one when
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination Act. The documentation re-
mains scanty today; it has even been seriously contended that such dis-
crimination has not been demonstrated to exist.
32
Certainly the Senate and House committee hearings and reports
and the floor debates which accompanied the adoption of the ADA,
included as part of the 1975 amendments to the Older Americans Act, 33
made no strong case-indeed, they really made no case at all-for a
society pervaded by ageism, needful of legislative firmness to lead it
toward a better, discrimination-free tomorrow. The Act was largely
written in the House of Representatives. Commissioner on Aging 34 Ar-
29. There is no question that the ADA is intended to apply to all age groups, and thus in-
cludes within its scope the young as well as the old, and all ages in between. See note 12 supra.
Meager as the legislative record is in support of the Act's being a considered response to the
documented discrimination leveled against the old, see notes 35-45 and accompanying text infra,
that record is even more barren insofar as a case is made that the young suffer from age discrimi-
nation in federally assisted programs. This is not to say, however, that strong and persuasive
arguments cannot be made that the young-particularly children--are the objects of unfair treat-
ment. See generally THE YOUNGEST MINoRrry I (S. Katz ed. 1974); THE YOUNGEST MINORITY
II (S. Katz ed. 1977). On the other hand, a strong argument, well documented, can be made that
the young are particularly favored as far as receipt of federal benefits and entitlements is con-
cerned. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, The Age Discrimination Act and Youth, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 969
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Teitelbaum]. There is nothing in the legislative history of the ADA
which explains Congress' thinking in applying the Act to all ages.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp: III 1979).
31. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1967 provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
32. See, e.g., Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975,
89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schuck].
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3002 (1976) (amended 1978).
34. The Commissioner on Aging heads the Administration on Aging, created pursuant to 42
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thur S. Flemming had asserted, when he appeared before the House
Committee on Education and Labor to address the then-pending
amendments to the Older Americans Act, that he felt that "in this
country we have to contend with racism, with sexism and with age-
ism."'3 5 But virtually nothing else was offered by him, or any other
witness, by way of empirical evidence supporting the existence and de-
gree of this latter "ism." The report of the committee accompanying
the legislation-the document which typically identifies the bases for
legislation which a committee is calling upon the House to adopt-also
provided no evidence of actual discriminatory practices warranting leg-
islative remediation.
36
The House debates on the bill were largely perfunctory, a series of
set speeches inserted in the Congressional Record with no colloquy
among the supposed speakers; they offered no concrete indictment,
save for the statement of the chairman of the House Select Committee
on Aging, Representative William J. Randall. He alone provided some
specific figures, to the effect that older persons were underserved in fed-
erally funded manpower training programs.
37
The Senate considered the Older Americans Act amendments sub-
sequent to the House acting upon them. Rather than following the
House's lead, the legislation reported out by the Senate Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare Committee only provided for a study to be done by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, this to include the Commis-
sion's findings and recommendations concerning age discrimination in
federally assisted programs. According to the Senate Committee,
"[t]here [was] some evidence that older persons [were] unreasonably
discriminated against on account of their age in the operation of feder-
ally assisted programs. ' 38 By way of specifics, its report further noted
that "[t]here [had] been reports of instances of individuals being dis-
criminated against in access to educational institutions or in obtaining
mortgages because of their age. ' '39 The study, it was thought, would
provide Congress with the data on which to base a decision as to fur-
U.S.C. § 3011 (1976) (amended 1978), and lodged within the Department of Health and Human
Services.
35. H.R. REP. No. 94-67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 94-67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
37. 121 CONG. REC. 9217 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Randall).
38. S. REP. No. 94-255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
39. Id. The problem of age bias in credit transactions was addressed in the same year the
ADA was enacted by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
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ther action.40
The Senate debates on the Senate bill were as nonsubstantive as
the House debates. Of course, there was considerably less to debate,
since the Senate bill only proposed a study.
In the conference committee of Senate and House members con-
vened to iron out the differences between the two houses' versions, an
awkward compromise was struck. The Senate acceded to adoption of
the Age Discrimination Act, with its ban on discrimination and its cor-
relative complicated exceptions 41 to the basic prohibition; the House
agreed to mandating the Civil Rights Commission to perform the dis-
crimination study which the Senate Committee had envisioned. This
mix was harmonized--such as it could be-by provision for the Act not
going into effect until regulations were issued implementing it, these
regulations in turn to be delayed until transmittal to Congress of the
Civil Rights Commission study.42 Thus, Congress was, at the same
time, called upon by the conference committee both to legislate against
a purported wrong and to mandate a study the very purpose of which
would be to determine if the wrong even existed.
Once again the House debates, now focused on the conference bill
and the accompanying report,43 afforded no insight as to the existence
of the discrimination which the authors of the legislation claimed to be
combating." In the Senate, however, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton ex-
pressed considerable reservations, these being articulated notwithstand-
ing that he was manager of the legislation:
The provisions of this bill which prohibit age discrimination in
40. In the Senate Report on the Senate bill, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
reasoned:
When the results of the Commission's study are available, the Congress will have
for the first time a thorough analysis of the causes, scope, nature and extent of age dis-
crimination in federally assisted programs. At that time, the need for additional legisla-
tion on this subject can be fairly and reasonably assessed.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 32.
41. The primary statutory exceptions are quoted at text accompanying note 60 infra. These
are discussed in Alexander, supra note 17. There are also further exceptions established by the
regulations implementing the Act. See notes 89-129 and accompanying text infra.
42. See note 10 supra.
43. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-670, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT].
44. Representative William J. Randall was the sole legislator to deal in anything close to
specifics:
Over the long pull, experience has given us a rather clear picture that whenever the
aged are included in programs or activities along with the general population--such as
CETA, revenue sharing, mass transit, et cetera, to mention a few--the aged fare very
poorly. For such reasons,. . . there is excellent justification for the immediate enact-
ment of the age discrimination provisions of the Conference Report. ...
121 CONG. REC. 37300 (1975).
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federally-assisted programs and activities have caused me much diffi-
culty ..... I share the concern of the Members of the House, who
supported these provisions so strenuously, that there may be other-
wise qualified individuals who are denied access to such programs
solely because of their age, but I could never get satisfactory answers
to certain fundamental questions, such as "Which programs? In
what numbers? Who decides what age discrimination is unreasona-
ble?"
45
The conference report was adopted by a vote of 404-6 in the House
on November 19, 1975,4 and 89-0 in the Senate on November 20,
1975.47 President Ford, not without misgivings, signed the bill into law
on November 28, 1975.48
The Civil Rights Commission Study
Mandated by the Age Discrimination Act to conduct a study,49 the
Civil Rights Commission selected ten federal programs for scrutiny, as
well as the general field of higher education. It ultimately concluded
that "discrimination on the basis of age is widespread," 50 with depriva-
tion affecting persons within several age categories. Those aged 65 and
over were "consistently adversely affected." 5' From the study flowed a
45. Id. at 37735. Senator Alan Cranston also adverted to such concerns. See id. at 37744.
The Senators' uneasiness was perhaps reflected, although in much more muted tones, in the
conference report itself, in which the conferees stressed "the importance of the study. . . to be
conducted by the Civil Rights Commission," and further stated:
Where there is found evidence that participation in such programs is affected by
distinctions based on age, then the Commission ought to consider the reasonableness of
such distinctions. . . . A thorough, objective, and thoughtful study of this subject is
essential to a final resolution by the Congress of the difficult policy issues that are left
undecided by this legislation.
HousE CONFERENCE REPORT, smpra note 43, at 59. Thus, the conferees revealed that they appar-
ently neither knew if, nor where, age discrimination existed. Nor did they even know--assuming
that it did exist-whether it could, or should, be tolerated. See 121 CONG. REC. 37300 (1975).
46. Id. at 37301.
47. Id. at 37752-53.
48. In signing the bill, President Ford stated:
There are. . . provisions of this act with which I disagree. The provisions con-
cerned with age discrimination on the part of all Federal grantees have been modified to
meet many, but not all, objections. The delineation of what constitutes unreasonable age
discrimination is so imprecise that it gives little guidance in the development of regula-
tions to prohibit such discrimination. Also, the provisions raise a question on the extent
to which the Federal Government should seek to regulate private activity, particularly
without holding hearings to permit affected persons and institutions to be heard.
The bill does provide, however, for study of the problems of age discrimination by
the Commission on Civil Rights, and allows for these issues to be discussed thoroughly.
I urge the Congress to reconsider these problems.
PUB. PAPERS: GERALD FORD, 1975, BOOK II, at 1919 (1977). As to the reasonableness standard to
which the President adverted, see notes 59-65 and accompanying text infra.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6106(a) (1976).
50. AGE DIsCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 25, at 3.
51. Id.
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number of Commission recommendations,5 2 some of which were
adopted by Congress when it amended the ADA in 1978.53
The Commission's study at least appeared to finally provide that
data base which had hitherto been strikingly meager in both quality
and quantity. It must be noted, however, that there is room for consid-
erable criticism of the study. Its methodology can be, and has been,
attacked;54 thus its conclusions are subject to question. These criticisms
were not raised, however, at any point during the debates on the 1978
amendments; as far as Congress was concerned, the study apparently
supplied vindication for the proponents of legislation tying the antidis-
crimination condition to receipt of federal funds.
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION
The underlying problem throughout the ADA is Congress' inabil-
ity to come to grips with just what it was that it wanted to prohibit.
That problem is manifested in two striking ways: one is the Act's reli-
ance upon a reasonableness standard; the second is the statute's deploy-
ment of very deep, albeit sometimes ambiguous, exceptions.
Compounding the problem are the government-wide regulations
52. In addition, each agency as to which the Commission made findings was to submit its
comments and recommendations regarding the report to the President and the congressional com-
mittees having jurisdiction as to the Older Americans Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6106(e) (Supp. III 1979).
53. The Commission made 12 recommendations, some of which were divided into several
subsections. See AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 25, at 83-102. The first was that age be
allowed as a criterion for eligibility in federally assisted programs and services only when a fed-
eral law specifically so authorized. In pursuance of this recommendation, the Commission advo-
cated the striking of the word "unreasonable" from § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976), and the related
amending of § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1976), which embodies the exceptions to the statute's prohi-
bition and which also employs a reasonableness standard. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text
infra. The former was done in 1978. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976), as amended by Comprehensive
Older Americans Act, Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 1555.
Second, the Commission recommended the authorization by private individuals of suits for
legal and equitable relief. Authorization of suits for injunctive relief was added by the 1978
amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(c), 92 Stat.
1555 (1978).
Third, the Commission recommended that HEW be authorized to approve all other agencies'
regulations implementing the ADA. The 1978 amendments adopted this proposal. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6106a(a) (Supp. l1 1979). See note 10 supra.
Fourth, the Commission proposed an alternative administrative remedy to that of absolute
funding termination, advocating that in instances of violation of the ADA, the funding agency be
authorized to transfer the funds to an alternative qualified recipient. The 1978 amendments
adopted this proposal. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(c)-
(d), 92 Stat. 1555-56 (1978).
The fifth through tenth recommendations addressed internal agency practices designed to
enhance the statute's effectiveness. The remaining recommendations addressed the amending of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189,
and the matter of discrimination in education programs.
54. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 29; Schuck, supra note 32, at 49-52.
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promulgated by the then Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare55-- regulations which each federal funding agency is to follow in
devising its own agency-specific regulations. 56 This paper will only
briefly address the statutory exceptions; they will receive much more
trenchant analysis in a later paper included in this symposium treat-
ment of the Age Discrimination Act.57 The reasonableness standard,
however, deserves some scrutiny inasmuch as it is so revealing as to
Congress' difficulties in devising social policy, and in translating what
turned out to be ill-defined policy into statutory language.
The Reasonableness Standard
The current form of the ADA's statement of purpose in section 302
of the Act condemns, without caveat, age discrimination:
It is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance, including programs or activities receiving funds under the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 . . .58
The originally enacted version of the statute was not so uncompromis-
ing; it only addressed "unreasonable" discrimination.59 This standard
was carried forward-and remains-in some of the primary statutory
exceptions. Thus, as it did prior to the 1978 amendments, section 304
provides:
(b)(1) It shall not be a violation of any provision of this chapter, or
of any regulation issued under this chapter, for any person to take
any action otherwise prohibited . . if, in the program or activity
involved-
(A) such action reasonably takes into account age as a factor
necessary to the normal operation or the achievement of any statu-
tory objective of such program or activity; or
(B) the differentiation made by such action is based upon rea-
sonable factors other than age. 60
The initial version of the ADA--that first passed by the House in
55. Hereinafter referred to as HEW. HEW has since been broken up into the Department of
Education and the Department of Health and Human Services, with the latter supplanting HEW
in terms of government-wide tasks under the ADA. 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. III 1979).
56. See note 10 suprq.
57. See Alexander, supra note 17.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 1979). The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31
U.S.C. § 1242(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1976 & 1980), contains its own age discrimination proscrip-
tion, and the legislative history makes clear that the ADA does not supplant it. See, e.g., 122
CONG. REC. 29903 (1976) (statement of Sen. Gravel during the debate on the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act provision). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1165, Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 98
n.4a (1976).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976) (amended 1978).
60. Id. § 6103(b) (emphasis added).
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April 1975--did not employ the word "unreasonable" in the Act's
statement of purpose.6' It was added by the Senate in response to ex-
pressions of concern by the Ford Administration as to the ambiguity of
the reasonableness language in the exceptions, 62 and was retained by
the House-Senate conferees in the final bill. Of course, by increasing
the statute's use of this word the conferees actually, and inexplicably,
compounded the problem. What was explained, however, was Con-
gress' modest appreciation of the vice of ageism:
The provisions in the House bill relating to age discrimination
were modeled on title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-which
authorizes the cut off of funds to federally-assisted programs found
guilty of racial discrimination-but with a significant difference.
Distinguishing among individuals on the basis of race for purposes of
determining their eligibility to receive the benefits of, or participate
in, federally-assisted programs is per se unfair treatment and viola-
tive of the Constitution; in this context, race is an arbitrary distinc-
tion. But age may often be a reasonable distinction for these
purposes, indeed, the prohibition against age discrimination con-
tained in the House bill excluded cases where age is "a factor neces-
sary to the normal operation of such [federally-assisted] program or
activity," or where the "differentiation. . .is based upon reasonable
factors other than age," or where the program or activity in question
"provides any benefits or assistance to persons based on the age of
such persons."
What the House bill implies in this regard, the conference sub-
stitute makes explicit. The purpose of the title is stated to be the
prohibition of unreasonable age discrimination . . . . The actual
prohibitory language of section 303 that is central to this title is mod-
ified by considerations of reasonableness, as the exclusions quoted in
the preceding paragraph make clear.
63
The conferees were of course not blind to the ambiguity of the
standard of reasonableness: "The difficulty, obviously, lies in establish-
ing what age-related distinctions are 'reasonable' with respect to each
federally-assisted program or activity, and on this there is not a clear
consensus among the conferees." 64 The conferees offered no answer.
Rather they stressed the importance of the Commission study and in-
61. The House bill, Title III of the Older Americans Act Amendments Act of 1975, provided:
Section 302. It is the purpose of this title to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
age in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
H.R. 3922, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
62. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 36-38.
63. HouSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. The conferees devised two steps which, it was hoped, would enable resolution of this
lack of consensus, as well as effective implementation of the ADA. First, the Commission study
was mandated to examine federal programs to discern "unreasonable" age discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 6106(a) (1976) (amended 1978). Second, the House bill was modified so as to provide
that the federal agency regulations to be issued to implement the Act would be the "sole means" to
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structed that where the Commission indeed did find evidence of age
distinctions being employed, "the Commission ought to consider the
reasonableness of such distinctions and, where appropriate, review the
social, economic, legal, and administrative effects of alternative re-
sponses to the question of what is reasonable in each case."' 65 Not sur-
prisingly, the conferees failed to suggest what weight ought to be given
such effects, let alone how to identify them.
In 1978 Congress amended the ADA so as to delete the word
"unreasonable" from the statement of purpose. As far as the statutory
exceptions were concerned, however, the reasonableness standard sur-
vived.
It was the House version of the Older Americans Act Amendments
which initiated the deletion of the word "unreasonable" from section
302. No explanation of the reasoning underlying this change was pro-
vided by the House report on the bill. 66 The House debate was unin-
formative. Representative Claude Pepper attributed the change67 to a
suggestion made by the Civil Rights Commission, which had actually
recommended deletion of the reasonableness standard throughout the
bill, and not just in section 302.68 Beyond that, nothing more was said.
effectuate the policy against age discrimination. HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, Supra note 43, at
57.
As to this latter change in the pending legislation, it must be noted that as the bill passed in
the House, enforcement was contemplated both through administrative fund cutoffs, and by "pat-
tern and practice" suits to be brought by the Attorney General. The conferees deleted the latter
enforcement mechanism from the Act. Why this exclusion of direct judicial redress should have
been seen as an effective response to the problem of determining the reasonableness issue is some-
what obscure. The thinking was that by foreclosing a large number of entities-that is, different
judges-from rendering judgments as to what was reasonable in different contexts, and by focus-
ing the question within the confines of the executive branch, with lead guidance being provided
for the whole government by one agency-HEW-uniformity of interpretation could be achieved.
Id. But given the fact that each government program, and the administration thereof, would call
into issue differing considerations, the hope that a regulatory approach could achieve a harmoni-
ous consistency, which judicial determinations could not otherwise do, seems somewhat short-
sighted. The very notion of reasonableness is one which inevitably requires either blind accept-
ance of any justification offered by the entity whose decision is being challenged, or, if legitimate
analysis is to be made, a consideration of the specific facts in the case. Courts as well as agencies
can readily opt for the former, perfunctory course. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Contra-
rily, if the latter, more responsible course is chosen, no more harmony can be expected from an
individual agency's application of regulations, no matter how much they resemble those of other
agencies, than would be expected from the courts.
In any event, the Act still authorized judicial review of agency determinations, albeit of a
limited nature, 42 U.S.C. § 6105 (1976), as well as Department of Justice enforcement of funding
recipients' obligations under the ADA, id. § 6104(a)(2) (1976), see note 161 infra, thus introducing
judicial scrutiny after all.
65. HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 59.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
67. 124 CONG. REC. 13599 (1978).
68. AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 25, at 86-89. See also note 53 supra.
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The conference committee on the 1978 amendments retained the
change. Again, floor debate-both in the House and the Senate-was
unenlightening.
69
Congress, then, had succeeded in first adopting, and later amend-
ing, a statute which purported to ban a vice whose contours were un-
clear, and as to which there were obviously very mixed perceptions. It
was left to HEW, in its mandated government-wide regulations, to cope
with this situation.70 What made this task particularly difficult was the
fact that even though the statute's statement of purpose was now shorn
of the word "unreasonable," the exceptions still retained the concept of
rationality by virtue of their very language. And enormous as the bite
of the exceptions would be even absent this standard, reasonableness
69. Representative Claude D. Pepper did endeavor, in his floor speech addressed to the con-
ference bill, to provide some substantive explanation for the change:
The present exemptions are retained, but I believe that the deletion of the word "unrea-
sonable" from the act's statement of purpose gives a good indication of how Congress
intends the existing exemptions to be interpreted. The ADA must be viewed as a civil
rights statute. As such, exceptions to it must be narrowly construed. I am particularly
concerned with certain excuses for not serving older people put forward by program
managers interviewed by the Civil Rights Commission in preparing its report. They
include the so-called cost-effectiveness argument, which asserts that, since it is often
more expensive to reach older clients, a program could reasonably conclude that it could
concentrate on younger persons. Other managers argue that the existence of age-specific
programs, such as the community service employment program for older Americans,
justifies other, more general programs, such as those funded under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act, ignoring the needs of older applicants.
Mr. Speaker, these excuses are nothing more than that. The deletion of the word
"reasonable" [sic] from the statement of purpose makes that clear. Such practices are
discriminatory. They will be prohibited under the new amendments.
124 CONG. REC. HI 1451 (Oct. 4, 1978). It is likely that Rep. Pepper was seeking to make the best
of a not altogether satisfactory situation, attempting to establish some legislative history which
would provide fodder for later court interpretations, and perhaps guidance for the agency regula-
tions which would follow enactment. While his interpretation carries a modicum of weight, it was
neither affirmed nor rejected, nor even responded to, by any other member. Most significantly,
neither the conference report, nor the manager of the bill, said anything akin to that which Rep.
Pepper uttered.
70. The Age Discrimination Study by the Civil Rights Commission, see notes 49-54 and
accompanying text supra, had proposed a "tentative definition": "any act or failure to act, or any
law or policy that adversely affects an individual on the basis of age." AGE DISCIUMINATION
STUDY, supra note 25, at 3. This definition, however, is too simplistic, or at least unrealistic. The
15-year-old denied licensure for driving because he falls one year short of the minimum licensure
age set by his state's law is experiencing adverse treatment because of his age. It is clear that
Congress, in enacting the ADA, did not intend to legislate so broadly as to outlaw such a use of an
age distinction. (One or more of the statutory exceptions likely could sanitize this particular ex-
ample of any taint under the ADA, in any event. Certainly it would fit under the "any law"
exception embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1976), which exempts from the Act's reach any age
distinction embodied in "any law." The HEW government-wide regulations have interpreted this
term as including any federal, state or local law or ordinance enacted by a general purpose, elected
legislative body. 45 C.F.R. § 90.3 (1980). See generally Alexander, supra note 17.) Nor is it likely
that the federal legislature today would be willing to amend the Act to trench so deeply into a
matter of local concern, particularly given the difficulties and expense of devising the only likely
alternative to the use of age lines-workable, competency-based testing.
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makes their reach even broader.7'
The Regulatory Effort to Define Discrimination
"As a general rule," the Overview of the regulations72 states, "sep-
arate or different treatment which denies or limits service from or par-
ticipation in a program receiving Federal financial assistance will be
prohibited . . . . 73 The regulations purport to provide more formal
guidance in determining what constitutes unlawful acts by setting forth
"Rules Against Age Discrimination": 7
4
The rules stated in this section are limited by the exceptions con-
tained in sections 90.14 [relating to the normal operation and statu-
tory objectives of programs75] and 90.15 [relating to reasonable
factors other than age 76] of these regulations.
(a) General rule: No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
7 1. Actually, HEW, in its government-wide regulations, has attempted to restrict the reason-
ableness standard by regulatory interpretations which impose more rigor than the statutory lan-
guage appears to allow. Consequently, the HEW regulations are subject to possible attack as
exceeding agency authority. See Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 234 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 627 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1980).
In interpreting the two exceptions embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976), see text
accompanying note 60 supra, HEW devised a four-part test which the user of an age distinction
must satisfy in order to be able to successfully invoke one or the other of these statutory caveats.
45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (1980). The test imposes a burden heavier than mere rationality, a tack possibly
justifiable by the provision's reference to distinctions being reasonable if they are necessary to the
normal operation of the program or a statutory objective of the program. The test provides:
An action reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal
operation or the achievement of any statutory objective of a program or activity, if:
(a) Age is used as a measure or approximation of one or more other characteris-
tics; and
(b) The other characteristic(s) must be measured or approximated in order for the
normal operation of the program or activity to continue, or to achieve any statutory
objective of the program or activity; and
(c) The other characteristic(s) can be reasonably measured or approximated by the
use of age; and
(d) The other characteristic(s) are impractical to measure directly on an individual
basis.
Id. In the analysis accompanying the regulations, HEW explained as to subpart (c) of the test that
"[implicit in the requirement that a characteristic be reasonably measured or approximated by
the use of age is the idea that there must be a close relationship between age and the characteristic
being measured." 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,782 (1979).
As to the "reasonable factors other than age" exception embodied in 42 U.S.C.
§ 6103(b)(i)(B) (1976), see text accompanying note 60 supra, the government-wide regulations
hold that "[a]n action may be based on a factor other than age only if the factor bears a direct and
substantial relationship to the normal operation of the program or activity or to the achievement
of a statutory objective." 45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1980).
72. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,769-71 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Overview].
73. Id. at 33,769.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Rules].
75. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
76. Id.
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of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.
(b) Specfc rules: A recipient may not, in any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance, directly or through con-
tractual, licensing, or other arrangements use age distinctions or take
any other actions which have the effect, on the basis of age, of:
(1) Excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits
of, or subjecting them to discrimination under, a program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance, or
(2) Denying or limiting individuals in their opportunity to
participate in any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
(c) The specific forms of age discrimination listed in paragraph
(b) of this section do not necessarily constitute a complete list.
77
This effort at definition is weakened, in the first instance, by the
fact that, as the Rules themselves state in their preface, they are limited
by the later provisions of the regulations interpreting three of the statu-
tory exemptions. Secondly, even this preface is inadequate to reveal
fully the Rules' limitations because the statute and/or other provisions
of the regulations actually set out further exemptions which supersede
the Rules-e.g., exemptions dealing with employment practices, 78 af-
firmative action 79 and special benefits programs.80
Apart from the Rules being limited by the exceptions provisions of
the regulations, and by the additional limitations imposed by statutory
and regulatory exceptions not noted in the Rules, there is further diffi-
culty as to the provisions establishing any substantively significant gui-
dance. The Rules fall back on the language of the statute, addressing
themselves to "discrimination." Given that "discrimination" is never
directly defined, the result is to fashion Rules Against Age Discrimina-
tion which erect a ban on age discrimination-a tautological non se-
quitur which advances the inquiry not at all.8'
77. 45 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1980).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1976).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(b) (1980). See notes 89-118 and accompanying text infra.
80. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(c) (1980). See notes 119-29 and accompanying text infra.
81. Indeed, given the phrasing of 45 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1980), there is a potential for heightened
ambiguity. Both in the "General rule" and in subsection (1) of the "Specific rules," the regulation
sets forth a ban on exclusion from programs, denial of benefits, "or" subjection to discrimination.
The use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that exclusion and denial are in some manner different
than acts which would constitute typical discrimination. Yet it would seem, logically, that exclu-
sion and denial would be the paradigms of discriminatory acts. If the disjunctive presentation is
to be given real credence, then, the search for that which constitutes discrimination is made even
more difficult and the answer rendered even more elusive. The better reading would likely be to
ignore the disjunctive connective, and read the language as actually intending to encompass exclu-
sion from programs, denial of benefits, and subjection to additional, or other, forms of discrimina-
tion.
Admittedly, the Rules, using the language they do, simply track the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 6102
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Conclusion and Rationale
One is left with the conclusion that the most tenable means by
which to define what it is the ADA bars is to proceed by negative con-
clusion: the discrimination which is outlawed is that discrimination
which the Act and the regulations do not, through their exemptions,
sanitize of taint. This task of addressing the exemptions is in part ven-
tured here, through examination of the affirmative action and special
benefits provisions in the government-wide regulations issued by HEW
to implement the Act. The primary statutory exceptions are addressed
in a later paper in this symposium. 82 Before that essay, however, some
recapitulation is in order as to the Age Discrimination Act's elusive
condemnation of ageism.
Why the difficulties in setting forth a coherent scheme? One ex-
planation, no doubt, follows from the lack of empirical data--there
simply was no compelling case made to justify this statutory venture.
Had there been, and had there been sufficient discrete examples of the
places and manner in which discrimination occurred, perhaps Congress
might have been better able to design a statutory structure with some
coherence and clarity. That is a possibility. Actually, however, the
problems go deeper, and it is doubtful that more adequate data would
have sufficed. For underlying the statutory ambiguities is a greater
concern for opponents of ageism: the congressional perception that
distinctions made on the basis of age simply do not carry the same type
of taint as does race-based discrimination, or discrimination on the ba-
ses of sex, religion or national origin, for that matter.8 3 Age is, after all,
a long-standing criterion for decisionmaking and for the allocation of
resources in our society.84  Few-and certainly not Congress-are
ready to seek an age-blind society, even assuming it were possible,85 for
age distinctions serve useful ends, such as that of easing bureaucratic
(1976), and that section in turn simply tracks Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-I (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The drafters of the ADA cannot necessarily be faulted, then,
for employing apparently long-accepted language. But the drafters of the regulations can be
faulted for simply retaining the uninformativeness of the word "discrimination," and for main-
taining the ambiguity of the disjunctive presentation, rather than taking their mandate as an op-
portunity to provide rather simple clarification by deleting the word "or" and substituting in lieu
thereof "and."
82. See Alexander, supra note 17.
83. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
84. See generally Cain, The Growing Importance of LegalAge in Determining the Status of the
Elderly, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 167 (1974); Eglit, OfAge and the Constitution, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV.
859 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Eglit].
85. But see Neugarten, Policy/or the 1980s." Age or Need Entitlement?, in NATIONAL JOUR-
NAL ISSUES BOOK 48-52 (1979). Dr. Neugarten urges striving toward an age-irrelevant society, in
which age distinctions are used as seldom as possible.
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decisionmaking. 86
Thus, the ADA represents an uncomfortable compromise-a ges-
ture, on the one hand, to the opponents of ageism, while an effort, on
the other, to save age as a useful and proper ground for the distribution
of governmentally funded benefits and the framing and operation of
governmentally subsidized programs. The task, of course, was to draw
the line between unacceptable age discrimination and acceptable age
differentiation, and that was an effort which Congress could neither
conceptually nor politically handle.
The conceptual difficulty in succeeding with this distinction is
compounded by the fact that the ADA applies to all age groups. At
least in the instances of race, sex, religion and national origin, it is a
comparatively easy matter to identify those individuals who bear the
significant trait which triggers the forbidden discrimination and those
who do not. An individual is either black or white, male or female, etc.
To say that race or sex may not be used as a basis for differentiation,
then, is to make a commitment perhaps difficult of enforcement, but at
least clear in intent. The task in a given case is to implement that intent
by, at the outset, determining whether being black or female or Jewish
was indeed the basis for the challenged decision.
In contrast, age is a characteristic which everyone shares, in
greater or lesser amount. Thus, an unadorned assault on age distinc-
tions is a tricky task. To say-in the face of a 65-year-old's complaint
that she has been wrongfully excluded from a program because of her
age-that age is an inappropriate standard for eligibility may quickly
lead to a condemnation of all age standards for that program. Yet,
while the 65-year criterion may be properly condemnable, exclusion of
those, say, under age 16 may not be. Given the fact that all people are
possessed of the age trait, but are different as to how much of it they
possess, the devising of a scheme which saves some age distinctions
while banning others becomes a subtle enterprise.
There are persuasive reasons for distinguishing between age dis-
tinctions employed discretely to treat non-adults, and such distinctions
used to categorize adults of different ages.87 And, there are persuasive
arguments to be made for tolerating age distinctions which disadvan-
tage non-old adults for being too young, while condemning as discrimi-
nation age lines used to exclude or deprive those deemed too old for
86. See Eglit, supra note 84.
87. See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 29.
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whatever the program or activity at issue is.A8 In rushing to legislative
judgment, Congress simply left these subtleties of age, age distinctions
and age discrimination by the way-to no one's gain.
SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS
There are a variety of problems generated by the loose language of
the ADA and its implementing government-wide model regulations.
They are compounded by the number and depth of both the statutory
and regulatory exceptions which cut so significantly into the Act's pur-
ported prohibition of age discrimination. Over and above these con-
cerns, there are problems of implementation and enforcement. This
paper will not undertake a complete survey of all the ADA's problems.
It will focus on selected issues, as will other papers in this symposium
issue. Here, analysis will be directed to the affirmative action and spe-
cial benefits exceptions infused into the Act by the HEW government-
wide regulations; the problems of settlement involved in administrative
treatment of class and representative complaints; the matter of pin-
pointing the violative entity for purposes of agency enforcement; and
the problems of making out a prima facie case and of successfully in-
voking a statutory or regulatory defense.
Affrmative Action
While the ADA itself does not address the issue of affirmative ac-
tion, the HEW government-wide regulations do: "Even in the absence
of a finding of discrimination, a recipient may take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of conditions that resulted in limited participation
in the recipient's program or activity on the basis of age." 89 In other
contexts, court-ordered class-conscious steps by an entity found to have
harmed a class are a well-accepted means to redress the legal wrong
perpetrated.90 The government-wide regulations obviously move be-
yond this, however, by authorizing a program to undertake affirmative
action "[e]ven in the absence of a finding of discrimination .... "91
Despite the regulatory language, it does not necessarily follow that
recipients of federal financial assistance indeed may freely pursue af-
firmative action efforts. The inquiry as to this question must proceed
88. See Eglit, supra note 84.
89. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(b) (1980).
90. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
91. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(b) (1980).
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on two tracks, one concerning public recipients of federal funding, the
other involving private grantees.
Affirmative Action by Governmental Recipients of
Federal Financial Assistance
The HEW government-wide regulations simply establish that af-
firmative action efforts will not violate the ADA. However, they do
not-nor could they-relieve governmental grantees of constitutional
restraints flowing from the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.92 And because governmental entities are-in contrast with pri-
vate actors--subject to such constitutional limits, 93 constitutionally
based considerations cannot be ignored. Two decisions of the Supreme
Court are relevant in assessing the impact of such restraints here.
In University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke94 the Board
had authorized a state medical school to pursue a preferential admis-
sions policy directed towards increasing the numbers of minority group
members enrolled in the institution. Bakke was a white male who was
denied admission and consequently filed suit, contending that but for
the special program which allocated 16 of the 100 openings to minori-
ties, he would have been admitted. He relied both on the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.95 Bakke prevailed; there was, however, no majority
opinion. Four Justices rested exclusively on Title VI, and contended
that it demanded race-blindness, a requirement obviously not satisfied
by the school's program.96 Four other Justices equated Title VI with
the Constitution and reasoned that neither was offended by the pro-
92. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part:
No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
93. The fourteenth amendment applies to governmental action. The mere receipt of govern-
ment moneys, however, will not be enough to convert a private entity's action into state action.
See, e.g., Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
995 (1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of
Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1974). Contra, Simkin v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
State action cannot be implied from HEW's regulations. The affirmative action provision, 45
C.F.R. § 90.49(b) (1980), onlypermit affirmative action by grantees. In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court held that the government entity with whom the private
actor is allegedly aligned must order the alleged wrongdoing.
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
96. 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., with whom Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.,
joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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gram.97 Justice Powell provided the swing vote. He agreed that neither
the Constitution nor Title VI, which he likewise equated, outlaws all
consideration of race; he further concluded, however, that the school
program failed to satisfy either.98
All five Justices who ruled on constitutional grounds to hold that
race may be taken into account for affirmative action purposes were in
accord that the predicate for such action was the existence of past dis-
crimination. They departed on the issue of whether the Board of Re-
gents was competent to make a finding as to that past wrongdoing.
Justice Powell ruled in the negative:
Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position
to make, . . . findings [of constitutional or statutory violations]. Its
broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative
policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality ...
[I]solated segments of our vast governmental structures are not com-
petent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative
mandates and legislatively determined criteria.99
The four other Justices disagreed, reasoning that the Board was "vested
with full legislative (including policymaking), administrative, and adju-
dicative powers . . . ."100
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, l0 l a minority-preferential program again
was addressed. Here, it was Congress which had statutorily set a re-
quirement that 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works
projects had to be used by the state or local governmental grantees to
procure services and supplies from businesses owned and controlled by
members of minority groups. The Court upheld the statute in the face
of constitutional challenge, again without a majority opinion. Again,
however, there was majority agreement that such a preference had to
be based on the existence of past discrimination. There was also ma-
jority agreement that Congress was competent to make findings of such
past wrongdoing.
The five Bakke Justices, who had held that an affirmative action
program taking race into account was acceptable, construed both the
Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, they
97. 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. 438 U.S. at 319-20 (Powell, J.).
99. 438 U.S. at 309.
100. Id. at 367 n.42 (Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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equated the statutory provision with the equal protection clause. 0 2
Thus the requirements of findings, and competency to make those find-
ings, applied under the statute as well as the Constitution. Given that
the ADA is modeled after Title VI,103 the constraints placed upon the
latter logically devolve upon the ADA as well, absent some compelling
reason to the contrary, which is not present here.
The ADA regulations authorize affirmative action "[e]ven in the
absence of a finding of discrimination,. " 4Moreover, they set no
limits as to which governmental recipients may pursue such action.
Conceivably, then, under the regulations, the same medical school in-
volved in Bakke could now decide to establish a preferential program
for older applicants. It could attempt to implement this program ab-
sent any findings of past discrimination, provided simply that there was
"limited participation"'' 0 5 in the past. But, given Bakke and Fullilove,
it indeed would appear that the ADA regulations, admittedly not a
mandate but only an expression of permissiveness, suggest far more
than is constitutionally tolerable. For there must be findings of past
wrongdoing.l°6 And the government institution which is a recipient of
federal financial assistance and which seeks to embark upon its prefer-
102. See 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 325, 328 (Brennan, J., with whom White,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56.
104. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(b) (1980).
105. Id.
106. The HEW government-wide regulations purport to authorize affirmative action to over-
come the effects of conditions that resulted in "limited participation" in the recipient's program.
However, the Overview to the regulations, at a juncture not referring to the affirmative action
provision, is very clear in establishing that disproportionate allocation of resources does not con-
stitute a violation of the ADA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,771 (1979). Thus, the fact that in a
given program, persons under 45-who make up, say, 50% of the population-constitute three-
fourths of the program participants, while the other 50% of the population in terms of age makes
up only one-fourth, does not establish that the Act has been transgressed. Were this regulatory
prescription for the ADA to be carried over to governmental grantees operating under the consti-
tutional constraints of Bakke and Fulliloye, it is unclear how a grantee could ever establish that
there has been "limited participation" in a program so as to warrant affirmative action. The easi-
est standard of measurement, of course, would be a straightforward proportionality scheme-if
10% of the community served by the program is over 65, then 10% of the client population in the
program should be over 65. Statistics revealing a less than 10% participation level would warrant
affirmative action to boost the numbers up to that percentage. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979) (racial imbalance in work force); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 316 (1977) (racial discrimination in hiring teachers).
While the Overview injects some ambiguity, it addresses the question of what will constitute a
violation of the statute, whereas the regulations authorize affirmative action even absent a viola-
tion of the ADA. Thus, the Overview's caveat need not be deemed to directly intersect with the
affirmative action provision. In any event, since the Overview only goes to violations of the ADA
itself, it has no bearing on a governmental grantee's initial endeavors to make findings which will
then support an affirmative action effort, which in turn, according to the ADA regulations, will not
violate the Act.
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ential program further must have the institutional charter to make such
findings.
This reading is amplified by a post-Fullilove challenge to a federal
Department of Transportation regulation relating to preferential treat-
ment for businesses controlled by minorities and women. The court in
Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James10 7 stated:
[T]wo related requirements. . . must be satisfied by an administra-
tive agency seeking to establish a preferential classification of the
type here challenged.
First, the agency must have been given authority by Congress to
take such action. Second, the agency must have made findings of
past discrimination and have determined that its actions are respon-
sive to the discrimination. 108
That the ADA can be read on its face as embodying an authoriza-
tion by Congress for governmental grantee affirmative action free of
the constraints imposed by the Constitution is not a tenable interpreta-
tion. CentralAlabama Paving sustains this conclusion. There, the De-
partment of Transportation defended the legitimacy of its regulation by
invoking six statutes which it administered, and which the court agreed
reflected a national policy to halt discrimination based on race or sex.
The court rejected the Department's defense:
[The] third-party defendants [the state officials implementing the
regulation as a condition of receiving federal funds] have simply
failed to offer sufficient evidence of the sort of "detailed legislative
consideration" or conscious conferral of authority required by the
decisions of the Supreme Court before an administrative agency can
constitutionally impose the sort of race-conscious remedies now
under consideration. 109
The defendants also invoked Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
but the court found the same flaw with this reliance as it had with the
other statutes.
The one possible savings for age-directed affirmative action efforts
by governmental recipients of federal financial assistance follows from
the fact that both Bakke and Fullilove were couched in terms of race-
oriented programs. The courts have made clear that any use by gov-
107. 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
108. Id. at 636. Where properly empowered legislative or administrative bodies have made
determinations of past discrimination, affirmative action employment programs thereupon
adopted by such bodies have withstood constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Local Union No. 35,
IBEW v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3148 (1981); Detroit
Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3079 (1981);
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 957 (1974).
109. 499 F. Supp. at 638.
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emnment of racial distinctions evokes the most stringent judicial scru-
tiny;I 10 in contrast, the courts have shown a very relaxed concern under
the Constitution about age distinctions. "'1 Thus, the stringent demands
imposed by the Court in Bakke and Fullilove may accordingly not
carry over to the age context. While this reasoning has some merit, it
should be noted that in Central Alabama Paving the federal district
court did not ease the rigor of its holding insofar as the challenged
preference was applicable to women, even though gender-based dis-
crimination elicits less constitutional scrutiny than do race classifica-
tions. 1m2
In substance, the HEW government-wide regulations' affirmative
action provision does not require grantees to engage in affirmative ac-
tion; it is only permissive. As a basis for a valid defense by a charged
governmental grantee," 13 however, Bakke and Fullilove likely set the
standards and HEW's regulations (or those of the individual agencies
which are mandated to model their regulations on those issued by
HEW' 14) likely will not suffice, although the fact that it is age, and not
race, which is at issue here may warrant a contrary conclusion.
Affirmative Action by a Private Funding Recipient
Bakke and Fullilove speak to the constraints imposed under the
Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Constitu-
tionally based limits only apply to governmental grantees, however,
given that the fourteenth amendment only speaks to state action, and
that the mere receipt by a private entity of governmental moneys gener-
ally is not sufficient to establish the state action element. 15 Thus, pri-
vate recipients of federal financial assistance may not be as limited as
are governmental grantees. 16 As to private recipients, there need be no
110. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). See general, Eglit, supra note 84.
112. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
113. The recipient bears the burden of proof as to statutory defenses arising under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6103(b)(1)(A) and (B) (1976). 45 C.F.R. § 90.16 (1980). While the regulations are silent as to
defenses invoking the other statutory and regulatory defenses, certainly it must be the defendant
who likewise bears the burden.
114. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
115. See note 93 supra.
116. While the five Justices in Bakke who were willing to allow, in some circumstances, race-
oriented affirmative action programs spoke to Title VI, as well as the Constitution, they did so in
the context of a governmental grantee. Thus, the question of limits placed upon private grantees
was left open, although four did assert that the same standards should apply. 438 U.S. at 327
(Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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finding of discrimination; by the very terms of the regulations, how-
ever, there must have been conditions which led to past limited partici-
pation in the given program on the basis of age.
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, it may well be that standing alone the HEW
government-wide regulations, notwithstanding their embracing affirm-
ative action, sanction a practice which indeed cannot be legitimated in
many instances. After all, affirmative action in favor of one age group
can redound to the detriment of another group which is likewise de-
fined by age. In a medical school with a fixed number of openings for
new students, preference for those over 40 inevitably will diminish the
number of slots for those under 40. That is the type of result which the
Constitution may preclude and which the ADA presumably does pre-
clude absent such preferential action fitting within one of the Act's ex-
plicit exceptions." 7 At the least, to engage in affirmative action, a
governmental recipient of federal financial assistance will have to make
findings of past discrimination, and will have to be institutionally
equipped and authorized to make such findings. These are require-
ments which the affirmative action regulation unacceptably ignores."
8
Special Benefits
There is one particular type of activity which the government-wide
regulations identify and approve of as acceptable "voluntary affirma-
tive action":
If a recipient operating a program which serves the elderly or
children in addition to persons of other ages, provides special bene-
fits to the elderly or to children the provision of those benefits shall
be presumed to be voluntary affirmative action provided that it does
not have the effect of excluding otherwise eligible persons from par-
117. Were an affirmative action plan to be justifiable under one of the specific statutory excep-
tions, the foregoing analysis of course would not be necessary. Thus, the issue is whether, when a
voluntary plan does not qualify under one of the exceptions, it can nonetheless be sustained in the
face of a claim that it violates the Act.
118. Assuming that the requirements of Bakke and Fullilove have been met as to governmen-
tal grantees, and the requirements of the regulatory language have been satisfied by private grant-
ees, the question arises as to the scope of affirmative action which may be undertaken. The short
answer is that the effort can be no greater than needed to remedy the past wrong. Once the
present situation has been brought to the point it would have been at but for the past wrong or
past conditions producing the limited participation, the occasion for affirmative action has ended.
Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (temporary plan to correct racial imbal-
ance in work force); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (school desegre-
gation plan not perpetual).
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ticipation in the program." 19
The Overview to the regulations provides an explanation for this
provision. HEW apparently recognized that the statutory language
might lead to the downfall of special benefits programs, and concluded
that Congress could not have really intended such a result:
[T]he Congress has consistently made clear its support for the
concerns of older persons. It is therefore unlikely that Congress in-
tended the Act to call into question the generally accepted special
benefits which are provided to older persons in programs that are
otherwise available to a wider age range of the population. Public
comment on the [proposed] regulations was almost unanimously sup-
portive of these benefits, which often take the form of special dis-
counts. Similarly, no one has suggested that similar benefits for
children should be questioned under the Act.
120
Notwithstanding HEW's obvious support for "the continuation of
special benefits for children and older persons,"'121 the regulatory provi-
sion is not free from question. There is first the matter of focus. Spe-
cial age-based benefits programs are described as "voluntary
affirmative action." Yet, in the preceding subsection (b) of the same
section, the regulation speaks of "affirmative action to overcome the
effects of conditions that resulted in limited participation in the recipi-
ent's program or activity on the basis of age."' 122 Thus, affirmative ac-
tion is viewed, in the prior subsection, as a step to overcome past
inadequacy. In subsection (c), speaking to special benefits programs,
apparently no such predicate----ie., past disadvantage-is necessary.
It is doubtful, then, whether special benefits programs should be
cloaked in the language of affirmative action. Deprived of this rhetori-
cal garb, special benefits programs appear to be nothing more than
what they are: special benefits.
A reduced fare program employed in a public mass transit system
illustrates the dubious substantive tack of the regulation. One can en-
vision what is, in fact, a common type of program: all persons under 18
and over 60 are allowed to ride a city's public buses at half fare. 123 No
needs test is applied to determine those who actually require such a
subsidy. Rather, age is the sole criterion. According to the regulation,
119. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(c) (1980).
120. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,771 (1979).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(c) (1980).
122. Id. § 90.49(b). See text accompanying note 89 supra.
123. Actually, there is statutory authorization for such programs for older persons, pursuant to
§ 5(m) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1604(m) (1976), and thus the
example would in any event fit under the ADA's "any law" exemption, embodied in 42 U.S.C.
§ 6103(b)(2) (1976). See generall Alexander, supra note 17. For the purposes of hypothesis, how-
ever, the example--ignoring the existence in reality of the statute--is a useful one.
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this special benefits program does not run afoul of the ADA so long as
"it does not have the effect of excluding otherwise eligible persons from
participation in the program."' 24
The critical task is that of defining the word "program." Inasmuch
as the extension of a reduced fare to certain age-defined individuals
does not foreclose the ability of those aged 18 to 59 from riding the
buses-albeit at the higher, regular fare-presumably the regulation's
standard is satisfied, so long as the "program" is the whole system of
public transit. However, if the "program" is defined, not as the general
transit system, but just as the subsidy fare system, then of course those
over 18 and under 60 are indeed excluded from participation in it, and
the regulatory provision is transgressed.
The obvious intended reading of the regulation's application is the
former, i e., the "program" is to be considered the whole transit system,
rather than just the reduced fare operation. For if the latter interpreta-
tion were followed, every special benefits program would fall-the very
consequence HEW clearly desired to avert. Whatever HEW's desire,
however, its approach seems strained at best, and certainly self-serving.
The agency was attempting to save programs which, if they did not fit
within one of the specific statutory exceptions-which they may well
not-would violate the ADA. The more straightforward approach
would be to accept the ADA for what it purports to be-a statutory
assault on ageism-and to let special benefits programs either satisfy
the statutory requirements or otherwise fall. After all, the 40-year-old
unemployed mother of three, unable to afford a car and needful of bus
service to seek jobs, is surely a victim of adverse, age-based treat-
ment. 125 There really is no persuasive reason why the ADA should not
protect her. Candor compels the admission that ageism exists-even
when some benefit-so long as some are harmed. If it can be shown
that the special discount can fit within one of the statutory exceptions,
ie., that it is reasonably necessary to achieving a statutory objective,
26
or is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the transit sys-
tem,' 27 or is established by a specific statute, 28 or is based on a reason-
able factor other than age, 129 then the program can survive. That is
124. 45 C.F.R. § 90.49(c) (1980).
125. At a more generalized level, it could be argued that absent the fare subsidy for the few,
there would be higher transit revenues derived from charging those who are specially benefited
the normal fare, thereby perhaps enabling a general fare reduction for everyone.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(A) (1976). See generally Alexander, supra note 17.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(A) (1976).
128. Id. § 6103(b)(2). See generaly Alexander, supra note 17.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(l)(B) (1976). See generally Alexander, supra note 17.
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what Congress wanted, as the ADA reveals. Failing to meet the meas-
ure of the statute, an age distinction--even one devised for a beneficent
purpose of extending a special benefit--should not survive.
Mediation-Induced and "Initial" Investigation-Induced Settlements in
Class Actions and Representative Complaints
A unique feature of the ADA, as implemented by the HEW model
government-wide regulations, is the regulatory prescription for media-
tion to be attempted when a complaint is lodged with the funding
agency as to a funding recipient allegedly in violation of the Act.13
0
The mediation itself is to be conducted under the auspices of the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service.'
31
The desired result of mediation is a settlement agreed to by the
parties. ' 32 If mediation fails, the agency is, at the "initial" investigation
stage which follows, 13 3 to in any event attempt to secure a resolution
"to the mutual satisfaction of the parties."' 34 Since complaints may be
filed not only by individuals, but also by a class representative and by
organizations on behalf of their members or on behalf of other individ-
uals, 135 such settlements can take on considerable complexity inasmuch
as interests of individuals not personally participating in the process
will be affected.
Assume a situation where a complaint is filed on behalf of a class
of grievants, of which the actual complainant may be a member, or on
behalf of "other" persons by an organizational representative. It is pos-
sible that a mediated settlement, or a settlement induced by the agency,
may be satisfactory to the actual complainant but may not be similarly
acceptable to other individuals on whose behalf the complaint ostensi-
bly was filed. Were this a federal court action, rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 36 would require that notice of the proposed
settlement be given to all putative class members, even if the class had
not yet been certified. 137 The purpose of that provision, of course, is to
protect the interests of those persons whose rights might be affected by
130. 45 C.F.R. § 90.43(c)(3) (1980). See generally Marlin, supra note 10.
131. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,788 (1979).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 90.43(c)(3)(ii) (1980).
133. Id. § 90.43(c)(4).
134. Id.
135. "A complaint may be made by an individual, a class, or by an organization on behalf of
its members or on behalf of other persons." 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,775 (1979).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
137. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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the settlement. By being given notice, they then can seek to intervene
in the action to safeguard their interests if they feel the settlement is
inadequate. Neither the HEW government-wide regulations, nor any
agency-specific regulations, require such notice--or any communica-
tion for that matter-with parties who are not named complainants.
While the mediation-induced and initial investigation-induced set-
tlements contemplated by the HEW government-wide regulations of
course do not arise in a courtroom setting, certainly the interests of
class members, as well as individuals on whose behalf an organization
files a representative complaint, are deserving of protection. Thus,
such settlements should not be deemed final until reasonable notice has
been given all class members or other affected individuals as to the
terms of a given settlement, which notice should further apprise these
persons that they may seek to intervene in the enforcement proceeding
if they object to the settlement. This is particularly important given the
180-day time limit for filing which most of the agency-specific regula-
tions have imposed. 38 A potential grievant may sit on his rights, be-
lieving them to be represented in an already filed class or representative
complaint, only to learn too late that the complaint was concluded by a
settlement at a point so long in the past that the 180 days for filing on
his own behalf have run.
At the very least, if a notice requirement is not to be observed,
then class members or other persons on whose behalf a complaint was
filed ought not to be deemed bound by the agreement. Moreover, dur-
ing the pendency of the class complaint, the 180-day filing period ought
to be deemed tolled as to such class members or other persons. 139
Admittedly, this process, designed to protect grievants, will likely
generate a disincentive for charged recipients to settle. On the one
hand, the giving of notice may bring out of the woodwork grievants
who might otherwise never have filed complaints, thereby escalating
the stakes in the controversy from the recipient's perspective. Such an
eventuality will disincline a charged recipient to enter into a settlement
in the first place. If the requirement of notice is not imposed, and the
suggested correlative ability of dissatisfied class members to initiate
their own complaints then follows, the charged recipient may likewise
138. The HEW government-wide regulations do not specify any time period within which a
private grievance must be filed with the funding agency. Notwithstanding that these regulations
are supposed to serve as a governing model for the individual funding agencies' regulations, al-
most all of the agency-specific regulations impose a 180-day statute of limitation. See, e.g., 44
Fed. Reg. 55,383-86 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 378) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 45 Fed.
Reg. 46,437-42 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 8a) (Department of Commerce).
139. Cf. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (antitrust).
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be disinclined to enter into a settlement, since it knows that that settle-
ment will not, after all, terminate its troubles.
Still and all, the purpose of the ADA is to protect victims of dis-
crimination. Any process which does not ensure that each alleged vic-
tim has an opportunity to vindicate his claim, either by knowingly
agreeing to be bound by a settlement or by allowing him to seek his
own redress, is an inadequate one. In any event, the same disincentive
to settlement which arises exists in court-filed class actions, and is one
which litigants have been able to deal with in that setting. Moreover,
the problem from the recipient's perspective can be unduly overblown.
In many instances, a settlement with one individual or organization
will after all produce a change in practices or policies which will benefit
all, and thus probably negate the likelihood of further complaints.
An additional element ought to be read into the mediation-in-
duced settlement process in class or representative complaints. While
the HEW government-wide regulations provide that an agreement be
submitted to the agency,140 they do not provide that the funding agency
has any authority regarding approval or disapproval of that agreement.
Thus, were a complainant to be "bought off" by a recipient, to the det-
riment of unnamed members of the class or of unnamed persons who
were ostensibly being represented by a complaining organization, the
agency would not have authority to reject that tainted agreement.
Again, in court-filed class actions, such settlements are subject to the
court's scrutiny to a limited extent.' 4' So, too, should such agreements
be subject to agency scrutiny here, so that an agency can assert the
authority to disapprove a settlement if it does not properly protect the
interests of unnamed, albeit potential, grievants. 142 Of course, inas-
much as individual grievants who are dissatisfied should, in accordance
with the foregoing discussion, be able to seek to intervene or at least
not be bound by an agreement to which they did not consent, the dan-
ger of a representative sabotaging the rights of those he represents is
mitigated. Even so, the administrative process should not lend itself to
adulterated agreements, as a matter of principle. Moreover, agency re-
jection of an inadequate agreement at the outset can achieve considera-
ble savings in agency time and, ultimately, in court time.
140. 45 C.F.R. § 90.43(c)(3)(ii) (1980).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
142. See, e.g., Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-103(A) (Supp. 1980).
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Pinpointing the Violative Program
The statute and the HEW government-wide regulations are very
clear in requiring that a violation of the ADA be pinpointed as to the
specific program guilty of wrongdoing, and that the scope of the rem-
edy be limited to only that program. Section 305(b) 143 provides that
enforcement shall be limited to the particular political entity or other
recipient with respect to which a finding of a violation has been made,
and it further requires that enforcement "shall be limited in its effect to
the particular program or activity, or part of such program. or activity,
with respect to which such finding has been made."' 44 A termination
of funding, or a refusal to fund, may not "be based in whole or in part
on any finding with respect to any program or activity which does not
receive Federal financial assistance."'
145
Thus, for example, if the Chicago Park District were to be found
in violation of the ADA because it excludes children under age 10 from
its federally assisted summer recreation program, funding termination
as to that particular program could be imposed. However, in theory,
termination could not be imposed as to other federally assisted pro-
grams of the Park District which are in compliance. Moreover, even if
it were established that a nonfederally assisted program of the Park
District was discriminating in a manner which, if it were receiving fed-
eral funds, would violate the ADA, the fact that the discriminatory pro-
gram receives no federal moneys theoretically precludes action under
the ADA as to the Park District's programs which do receive federal
assistance, as long as those programs themselves are not out of compli-
ance with the Act.
This narrow pinpointing for imposition of a penalty appears to
limit the effectiveness of the Act since it removes at least part of the
threat of funding loss which might otherwise hang over the head of a
recipient which is receiving federal funds for some of its efforts. The
program administrators will know that they indeed can engage in age
discrimination in their non-assisted activities without any fear of loss of
their federal moneys. They will also know that they can engage in dis-
criminatory acts, even in an assisted program, without running the risk
of losing their federal moneys for their other, complying assisted pro-
grams. On the other hand, the pinpointing of the actually violative
program has the benefit of protecting beneficiaries in nondiscrimina-
143. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (Supp. 111 1979).
144. Id. Accord, 45 C.F.R. § 90.47(b) (1980).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (Supp. III 1979). Accord, 45 C.F.R. § 90.47(b) (1980).
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tory programs who might otherwise, in the name of the agency's pro-
tection of rights under the statute, find themselves without any program
at all-no matter how zealously their own program administrators
complied with the ADA-because of fund termination.
The case law under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,146
which has an identical pinpointing provision, 47 reveals that the task of
identifying the specific unlawful program, and then confining the statu-
tory penalty to it, can generate conflicting conclusions. 148 In Bob Jones
University v. Johnson,149 for example, a federal district court held that
the receipt by university students of Veterans Administration education
benefits should be deemed tantamount to the university's receipt of
federal financial assistance, and thus all of the school's programs fell
under the onus of funding termination for violation of the statute. The
court found, notwithstanding that it was the students who were the di-
rect payees of the federal moneys, that the university in effect received
assistance in a number of ways:
First, payments to veterans enrolled at approved schools serve to de-
fray the costs of the educational program of the schools thereby re-
leasing institutional funds which would [otherwise] be spent on the
student. Analogously, . . . participation in the HEW administered
National Defense Student Loan program . . . relieved the university
from the burden of committing its assets to loans to eligible students.
[Second,] participation of veterans who-but for the availability
of federal funds-would not enter the educational programs of the
approved school, benefits the school by enlarging the pool of qual-
fied applicants upon which it can draw .... 150
Bob Jones University represents the most extreme interpretation of
the pinpointing requirement of Title VI. In _Flanagan v. President of
Georgetown College'5 the court also took a broad view. The plaintiff,
a white male law student, alleged that the law school's financial schol-
arship program, which gave preference to minority students, violated
Title VI. Relying upon the fact that the school received federal moneys
in the form of grants, loans and interest subsidies totaling over $7 mil-
lion for the construction of a new building, and further relying upon a
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
147. Id. § 2000d-1.
148. See generaly Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and
"'Program or Part Thereof" 78 MICH. L. REV. 608 (1980).
149. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'dmeL, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
150. 396 F. Supp. at 602-03. The court also relied upon the historical background of federal
educational benefits. In the past they had been made directly to the schools, and the change in
form of payment was not, in the court's view, sufficient to warrant not applying Title VI, which of
course would unquestionably apply were the payments still made in that earlier form. Id. at 603.
151. 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
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broad HEW regulation interpreting Title VI,152 the court held that the
entire school should be deemed to be the program receiving federal
financial assistance, and thus should be susceptible to funding termina-
tion. Thus, "by accepting federal financial assistance for the construc-
tion of the [new building], Georgetown and the Law Center were
required to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race in provid-
ing any service, financial aid or other benefit to its Law Center stu-
dents."153
The district court in Stewart v. New York University 154 took a con-
trary approach to a very similar factual situation. The plaintiff was a
white woman who had been denied admission to the defendant's law
school and who contended that Title VI was violated in that the law
school operated a minority admissions program which, on the basis of
race, admitted minority applicants with lesser qualifications than she
possessed.
The plaintiff pointed to the alleged receipt of federal financial
assistance; specifically, she noted federal student loans, "restricted pur-
poses" grants, tax deductions and exemptions-all of which benefited
the law school. Additionally, she identified a $625,000 indebtedness to
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development for the
construction of a law school dormitory. Notwithstanding these ele-
ments of alleged federal financial assistance, the court stated:
"[P]laintiff must show that the Federal financial assistance received by
the Law School constitutes more than a de minimus portion of its an-
nual revenues and that there is some material connection between said
assistance and the minority admissions policy challenged herein."' 55
Applying this standard, the court reasoned that the "connection" was
not shown. None of the moneys at issue were sufficiently related to the
minority admissions program, the program allegedly violative of Title
VI.
The highest court to construe the pinpointing requirement of Title
VI has taken an intermediate position between the extremes of Bob
Jones University on the one hand and Stewart on the other. In Board of
Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch,156 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit employed an "infection
152. The HEW government-wide ADA regulations do not clarify the pinpointing requirement
of the statute.
153. 417 F. Supp. at 384.
154. 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
155. Id. at 1314. Accord, McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D. N. Mex. 1970).
156. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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theory." As the basic, necessary approach, the court required a pro-
gram-by-program examination. Thus, the court vacated an HEW or-
der terminating all federal financial assistance to the Board, requiring
instead that HEW look to each Board program receiving federal mon-
eys to see if that particular program was in violation of Title VI. At the
same time, however, the court did not require that each program had to
be considered in complete isolation from its context: "[T]he adminis-
trative agency seeking to cut off federal funds must make findings of
fact indicating either that a particular program is itself administered in
a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by discriminatory practices
elsewhere in the school system that it thereby becomes discrimina-
tory." 5 7
Given that both Bob Jones University and Finch had been decided
prior to the enactment of the ADA, any effort to impute to Congress
knowledge of the manner in which the courts had construed Title VI,
whose pinpointing approach was incorporated into the ADA, is not
helpful, since the two cases are in disagreement. Given this case law,
however, it is clear that the Chicago Park District examples noted ear-
lier are properly stated with caution, with the notation that in theory
certain consequences could not follow upon discrimination by a given
specific program. For both the broad approach in Bob Jones University
and even the infection theory employed in Finch provide strong bases
for a reading of the ADA pinpointing provision in a more wide-ranging
manner than its literal statutory language might imply.
Private Actions-Establishing a Claim or Defense
The ADA on its face authorizes private actions; this is the product
of a 1978 amendment to the Act. 58 In addition, the statute authorizes
157. Id. at 1079. Finch also made another point which should be noted. The court required
that the administrative agency taking funding cutoff action must make findings of fact as to the
program at issue being infected by other discriminatory activities of the funding recipient. The
ADA, like Title VI, requires on its face "an express finding on the record" as a predicate for fund
cutoffs generally. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(a)(1) (1976). Finch makes specific the requirement, if the in-
fection theory is to be employed, that findings be made that indeed the particular program at issue
is infected with discrimination so that "a reviewing court [can] know that the effects of the order
entered by the agency have been limited to programs not in compliance with the. . .Act." 414
F.2d at 1079. That requirement, imposed in the context of a case arising under Title VI, should
likewise apply here.
158. The Act, as amended, provides:
(1) When any interested person brings an action in any United States district court
for the district in which the defendant is found or transacts business to enjoin a violation
of this Act by any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, such inter-
ested person shall give notice by registered mail not less than 30 days prior to the com-
mencement of that action to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
Attorney General of the United States, and the person against whom the action is di-
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administrative enforcement by the funding agency as to violations of
the statute. 159 And finally, the Act provides for enforcement by "other
means authorized by law,"160 which includes suit by the Attorney Gen-
eral against recipients which transgress the statute.'
61
The questions of establishing a claim or defense under the Act are
by no means simple ones to address. They require an examination of
the case law developed under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,162 on which the ADA is modeled,163 as well as under Title VII of
the 1964 Act.164 The HEW government-wide regulations implement-
ing the statute are also relevant. Complexity is exacerbated because
there is need to consider whether the elements necessary to establishing
a violation of the Act will vary depending upon whether the defendant
is a governmental or a private recipient of federal financial assistance,
as well as upon whether the charging party is a litigant in court or the
funding agency pursuing a funding cutoff or denial in an administra-
tive proceeding.
The Equal Protection-Title VI Analogy
There are arguments to be made that the ADA should be equated,
insofar as establishing a prima facie case and allocating burdens are
concerned, with the equal protection clause. There are also persuasive
arguments to the contrary. The significance of the equation follows
from two consequences. First, a prima facie case may be quite difficult
to establish if that equation is adopted. Second, an equal protection
rected. Such interested person may elect, by a demand for such relief in his complaint,
to recover reasonable attorney's fees, in which case the court shall award the costs of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, to the prevailing plaintiff.
(2) The notice referred to in paragraph (1) shall state the nature of the alleged
violation, the relief to be requested, the court in which the action will be brought, and
whether or not attorney's fees are being demanded in the event that the plaintiff prevails.
No action described in paragraph (1) shall be brought (A) if at the time the action is
brought the same alleged violation by the same defendant is the subject of a pending
action in any court of the United States; or (B) if administrative remedies have not been
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (Supp. III 1979). Title 42 U.S.C. § 6104(f) (Supp. III 1979) amplifies the
exhaustion requirement.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(a)(1) (1976).
160. Id. § 6104(a)(2).
161. The case law is well established, albeit not under the ADA-which has been the subject
of only minimal court attention thus far-that the Attorney General may sue grant recipients who
misuse federal moneys. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); United States v. Tatum Ind.
School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
163. See, e.g., HousE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56.
164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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analysis would be particularly protective of the defendant, even if the
prima facie case could be made out, with the result being that the fund-
ing recipient would in almost every instance prevail. Analysis of the
potential equation requires an examination of case law developed
under both the equal protection clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
In Washington v. Davis165 the Supreme Court established that to
make out a prima facie case under the equal protection clause the
plaintiff must prove that the challenged law or conduct "ultimately [is]
traced to a. . .discriminatory purpose."' 166 The Court thereby effec-
tively overruled a number of lower courts which had held that it was
sufficient for the plaintiff only to show that the challenged law or ac-
tion, however facially neutral, in fact had a discriminatory effect167-a
considerably easier legal hurdle to surmount because purpose is a par-
ticularly elusive matter. Typically, decisionmakers either do not articu-
late their purposes overtly, or they have multiple motivations. In any
event, they are unlikely to admit discriminatory intent; thus proof of its
existence other than by inference can be difficult. 168 In contrast, under
the effects test, the plaintiff, in order to make out a prima facie case,
need only show that the challenged law, regulation or action has a dis-
proportionately adverse impact on members of the group alleging
harm. For example, a program may have a policy that only persons
able to lift seventy pounds or more are eligible for participation. While
neutral on its face, the policy in practice operates to exclude a dispro-
portionate number of older persons. The showing by the grievant of
that impact would be sufficient on its own to make out a colorable, or
prima facie, violation of the Constitution.
Davis addressed constitutionally based claims and it does not nec-
essarily follow that the purpose requirement imposed on equal protec-
tion claimants carries over to statutory proscriptions of discrimination.
Indeed, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,169 for example,
which outlaws discrimination in employment on the bases of race,
color, national origin, religion and sex, the effects test applies in certain
settings,'7 0 Resolution of the question of whether the ADA must, or
should, be read so as to embody the constitutionally derived discrimi-
165. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
166. Id. at 240.
167. See the cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
168. See notes 192-95 and accompanying text infra.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
170. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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natory purpose requirement is informed by examination of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, given that Congress avowedly modeled
the ADA onit.
17 1
Until recently, a reading of Title VI as only requiring the showing
of a discriminatory impact to make out a prima facie case found con-
siderable sustenance in Lau v. Nichols,172 in which the Court held that
a school system violated the statute by failing to provide supplemental
bilingual and remedial instruction to non-English speaking students of
Chinese origin. The Lau Court upheld an HEW regulation which as-
serted the impact, or effects, standard as that properly applicable in
construing Title VI:
Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no pur-
poseful design is present: a recipient "may not. . . utilize criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substan-
tially ,mTairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
The Court stated that "[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect
even though no purposeful design is present."'
74
On the basis of Lau, several lower federal courts have held that a
prima facie case is made out under Title VI by a showing of discrimi-
natory effect alone. 175 Lau was decided before Washington v. Davis,
however, and thus cannot be said to actually address the intent-impact
issue in the context of making an overt choice between the two stan-
dards. What is more, two Supreme Court decisions subsequent to both
Lau and Davis suggest strongly that the impact interpretation is of du-
bious continuing validity.
In University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 176 a divided
Supreme Court struck down a medical school admissions program
which was attacked on both equal protection and Title VI grounds by a
rejected white male applicant, who challenged the program because it
gave preference to disadvantaged minority individuals. All of the Jus-
tices addressed Title VI, although there was no majority opinion. Jus-
171. See, e.g., HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56.
172. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
173. Id. at 568 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)) (emphasis in original).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980). Guardians was re-
versed on the effects issue subsequent to the decisions in University of Cal. Bd. of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 176-80 infra, and Board of
Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), discussed at text accompanying notes 181-84 infra.
176. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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tice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court. He concluded, drawing
upon the statute's legislative history, that "Title VI must be held to
proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause . . .. 177 Justice Brennan, writing for himself and
three other Justices, likewise equated the constitutional clause and the
statutory provision.178 As for Lau, he strongly indicated that it was no
longer good law.'
79
At least five Justices, then, were of the view that Title VI's con-
tours are defined by the equal protection clause.180 It thus follows that
for them it is necessary to prove discriminatory purpose in order to
establish a violation of the statute. In Board of Education v. Harris'8'
the Court addressed this issue once more, although more obliquely.
The Harris Court held that a discriminatory impact standard was man-
dated by Congress in suits brought to enforce the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1972.182 In so doing, the majority stated that "[iut does make
sense to us that Congress might impose a stricter standard [Z e., a stan-
dard easier for the plaintiff to satisfy] under ESAA than under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."183 The clear implication was that the
majority understood Title VI as embodying not the discriminatory im-
pact standard, but rather the standard of discriminatory purpose. The
three dissenters in Harris-Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist-
straightforwardly asserted that in their view Title VI did indeed require
this latter standard.' 8 4 Thus, all nine Justices-five of them in Bakke,
and the full complement in Harris-have either intimated or asserted
that the standards applicable to the equal protection clause apply as
177. Id. at 287.
178. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Justice Brennan stated:
We recognize that Lau, especially when read in light of our subsequent decision in
Washington v. Davis,. . . which rejected the general proposition that governmental ac-
tion is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, may be
read as being predicated upon the view that, at least under some circumstances, Title VI
proscribes conduct which might not be prohibited by the Constitution. Since we are now
of the opinion. . . that Title VI's standard, applicable alike to public and private recipi-
ents of federal funds, is no broader than the Constitution's, we have serious doubts con-
cerning the correctness of what appears to be the premise of that decision.
Id. at 352 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. The four remaining Justices in Bakke ruled on Title VI grounds alone, and did not ad-
dress at all the statute's relation to the equal protection clause.
181. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
182. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter referred to as ESAA].
183. 444 U.S. at 150.
184. Id. at 160 (Stewart, J., with whom Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, dissenting). Actu-
ally, the majority expressly declined to decide the Title VI intent issue. Id. at 149.
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well to Title VI.185 And since these two decisions, several lower federal
courts have so held.
186
The equal protection clause-Title VI equation, unsettled as it is,
embodies at least one additional ambiguity. In Bakke and Harris, and
in the lower court decisions which have since construed the two deci-
sions as establishing the intent requirement as necessary to the plain-
tiff's making out a prima facie case under the statute, the defendant has
been a governmental agency. Thus, at least in one sense, application to
that defendant of a test formulated under the Constitution and now
incorporated into a statute does not break any new jurisprudential
ground. If the defendant agency were sued directly under the Constitu-
tion, it would be the discriminatory purpose standard imposed upon
the plaintiff which would apply in any event; to hold, then, that that
same standard applies in the context of a suit brought under Title VI
places no new burden upon the plaintiff nor does it impose upon the
defendant any new legal exposure.
Private organizations, however, also receive federal financial
assistance. Being nongovernmental, such entities do not fall under the
sway of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 187 As to
them, then, application of the constitutionally based test in the context
of Title VI does pose a departure. Even if the Justices in Bakke and
Harris were correct in reading congressional intent in enacting Title VI
as being to parallel exactly the equal protection clause, that logic need
not carry over to private entities made subject to liability under the
statute. For as to them Congress was creating potential liability under
a statute which, but for the statute, would not have existed under the
Constitution in the first place.
Four Justices in Bakke were of the view that the same constitu-
tionally derived standards applicable under Title VI to governmental
discriminators were likewise to be applied to private recipients of feder-
185. It has not been held that the effects test, approved in Lau, is overruled. An argument for
its continuing validity can be drawn from the approving citation of Lau in the plurality opinion in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479 (1980).
186. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248
(2d Cir. 1980); Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981); NAACP v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp.
996 (D. Mass. 1979). But see Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
187. The case law is well established that the mere receipt of governmental funds by a private
entity is not sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See
note 93 supra.
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al financial assistance.18 8 No majority has spoken to the issue, how-
ever. Thus, it is unclear, even assuming the discriminatory purpose
standard applies under Title VI to a plaintiff seeking to make out a
prima facie case as to defendants such as that in Bakke, whether the
same standard carries over to private recipients of federal funds sued
under the statute.
Application of the Equal Protection Equation to the ADA
If the equal protection clause is equated with the ADA, the conse-
quences both for establishing a prima facie case and for allocating bur-
dens between the parties are significant. Where there is an overt age
distinction employed by a recipient, discriminatory purpose can be in-
ferred from the policy itself. There may be no such openly utilized
policy, however. Rather, a claim of discrimination may arise out of
alleged discriminatory treatment: i e., the recipient purports to treat all
people without regard to age, yet persons of a certain age--say, all
those 50 and over--are rejected. In such an instance, the task of estab-
lishing discriminatory purpose will be somewhat more difficult. Title
VI case law is not instructive. That developed under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,189 which bans discrimination in employment
on the bases of race, color, national origin, sex and religion, is. In Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 190 the Supreme Court set out the stan-
dard Title VII formula for establishment of a prima facie case of
discriminatory treatment. Transposed into the context of the ADA,
this would require that the plaintiff (or the enforcement agency) estab-
lish that the individual was qualified (but for her age) for the program,
that she applied for participation and was rejected, and that other per-
sons with the same qualifications (but for the age factor) were accepted,
or that the program at least held itself open to such individuals. By
making such a showing, an inference of discriminatory motivation will
have been established.1
9'
188. 438 U.S. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., with whom White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
190. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
191. It should be stressed that the foregoing formulation is not an exclusive one. In the con-
text of Title VII, the Supreme Court has observed: "The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas
for pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Thus, as one district court has ob-
served:
[Tihe notion of a prima facie case in a [Title VII] discrimination action is a fluid one.
Because the principle essentially embodies a rule of common sense, corresponding to the
inferences that will ordinarily be drawn from a particular set of circumstances, we see no
reason to hold that it can or must be expressed by a single formula.
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Finally, alleged discrimination may arise as the consequence of an
ostensibly neutral policy which has a disproportionate impact upon a
given age group. In such a case, the task of establishing discriminatory
purpose will be a particularly difficult one. The discriminatory impact,
or effect, of a facially neutral law or action is, although a relevant factor
to be taken into account in establishing discriminatory purpose, insuffi-
cient in and of itself to establish that purpose. 192 Moreover, although
the foreseeability of an adverse impact is a proper consideration in de-
termining discriminatory purpose, a foreseeable adverse impact is in
itself insufficient to establish such purpose; 193 discriminatory purpose
"implies that the decisionmaker. . . selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of [ostensibly neutral] action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'
94
Obviously, identification of discriminatory purpose will be a func-
tion of the particular facts in a given case. Given that only in rare
instances will a decisionmaker openly avow such a purpose, and given
the inherent subjective nature of this critical element of the prima facie
case, the task for the ADA grievant, enforcement agency or Attorney
Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
192. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
193. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
194. Id. at 279. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), dealing with race discrimination, the Supreme Court offered some suggestions of gen-
eral application as to how discriminatory purpose might be established under the equal protection
clause, even while recognizing the difficulty of the task. If the equal protection standards carry
over into the ADA so as to likewise require a showing of discriminatory purpose under the statute,
those guidelines are of utility here:
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a[, although not neces-
sarily the sole,] motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action...
may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the gov-
erning legislation appears neutral on its face. . . .The evidentiary inquiry is then rela-
tively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a [virtually 100% disparity of treatment as
between the victimized class and the favored group, demonstrating a] pattern as stark as
that in Gomillion [x Lighfooi, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)] or Yick Wo [v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)], impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. ... The specific se-
quence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the
decisionmaker's purposes. . . . Departures from the normal procedural sequence also
might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. Substantive departures
too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the deci-
sionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where
there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of
its meetings, or reports.
Id. at 266-68 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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General will by no means be a simple one. 195 There is, moreover, a
contribution made by the Overview to the HEW government-wide reg-
ulations which aggravates the problem. HEW there asserts that a dis-
proportionate allocation of resources by age or a disproportionate
enrollment of participants in terms of age will not, standing alone, es-
tablish a violation of the Act.196 Thus these factors presumably would
not make out a prima facie case in the first instance.1
97
In each instance--overt age policy, discriminatory treatment and
ostensibly neutral policy with a disproportionate impact-the prima fa-
cie case will have to be established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.198 Even if the prima facie case can be successfully established,
however, the plaintiffs (or enforcement agency's) task will hardly be
over. The burden will still lie with the proponent of the claim to fur-
ther establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the recipient's
policy is irrational. This follows from the treatment of age distinctions
under the equal protection clause.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,199 for example,
195. In Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), the
district court analyzed the impact-intent issue in a suit filed by private plaintiffs under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court concluded that as to their suit itself, the discriminatory
purpose standard applied. It then went on in dictum to suggest that a different standard would
apply, at least as to the pre-administrative hearing stages, in the agency enforcement process:
To subject . . . federal agencies responsible for monitoring federal expenditures to the
same procedural standards applicable to private litigants would undermine the utility of
Title VI. [The agency] should be permitted to impose a burden ofjustification whenever
evidence is developed of a disparate impact probative of discriminatory motive. This
would not justify a finding of discrimination under Washington v. Davis, but it would
enable [the agency] to examine the justifications advanced to ascertain whether evidence
for such a finding had been developed. For this reason, at the least, decisions such as
Lau [v. Nichols] . . .should retain their validity.
Id. at 236.
It is hardly surprising that a funding agency would not be held, in seeking to secure compli-
ance with a funding statute, to the task of establishing discriminatory purpose by the recipient
(assuming the equal protection-Title VI-ADA equation pertains). No actual penalty accompanies
compliance activities; moreover, it would be particularly difficult to separate out discrete stages in
the process, yet if that were not done, even an agency inquiry of a recipient as to its activities could
conceivably have to be preceded by the agency's establishing--to some tribunal's satisfaction-
that discrimination was occurring, and that it was based on a discriminatory purpose.
However, it is clear that at the actual fund termination or denial stage before an administra-
tive law judge, the funding agency-effectively the plaintiff in the proceeding-would bear the
burden of establishing discriminatory purpose if the equal protection analogy were to be adopted.
196. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,771 (1979).
197. This assertion is in accord with the Court's formulation of suggested means by which to
establish discriminatory purpose in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), see note 194 supra, where the Court asserted that disparities of
treatment as between different groups do not alone establish purpose-at least absent a virtual
100% differential between the favored and the disfavored classes.
198. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
199. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). See generally Eglit, supra note 84.
AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975
which involved an unsuccessful challenge to a state mandatory retire-
ment law, the Court said: "[T]he rational-basis standard. . . employs
a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the
drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task
and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifica-
tions is neither possible nor necessary. ' '2°° In Vance v. Bradley,20 also
involving an unsuccessful attack on a mandatory retirement law-in
this instance, one applicable to federal foreign service officers--the
Court expressed even greater deference to the legislative judgment: "In
an equal protection case of this type,. . . those challenging the legisla-
tive judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.
' 20 2
There is one matter of some perplexity, however. The HEW gov-
ernment-wide regulation specifies that "It]he burden of proving that an
age distinction or other action falls within the exceptions outlined in
sections 90.14 and 90.15 [of the regulations] is on the recipient of
Federal financial assistance. '20 3 Under the minimum rationality test,
the burden of justification never shifts-at least in the constitutional
cases-to the defendant. 2°4 The regulation, then, being inconsistent
with judicial authority, presumably falls.205 The burden of proving
that the statutory exceptions do not apply thus will be with the plaintiff.
The consequence, of course, of applying equal protection stan-
dards is to make extremely unlikely any chance of a plaintiff prevail-
ing. The discriminatory purpose requirement for establishing a
violation is itself an extremely difficult one to manage in those in-
stances where the funding recipient's program ostensibly operates in a
neutral manner. Even if the plaintiff or funding agency succeeds at
that stage of the process, he or it still bears the burden of proving irra-
tionality-a task doomed to failure in almost every instance.
Rejection of the Equal Protection-Title VI Analogy
If the equal protection-Title VI analogy is rejected as applying to
200. 427 U.S. at 314.
201. 440 U.S. 93 (1979). See generally Eglit, supra note 84.
202. 440 U.S. at 111.
203. 45 C.F.R. § 90.16 (1980) Section 90.14 addresses the "normal operation" and "statutory
objective" exceptions. See text accompanying note 60supra. Section 90.15 addresses the "reason-
able factors other than age" exception. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
204. See generally Eglit, supra note 84.
205. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 234 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1980).
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the ADA, the statute assumes considerably more rigor. The prima fa-
cie case would still be established in the same manner insofar as the
alleged violation of the ADA arises out of an overt policy 2°6 or out of
discriminatory treatment.207 As to an ostensibly neutral policy having
a disproportionate impact upon people of a certain age, however, the
task for the plaintiff or enforcement agency would be eased. Discrimi-
natory purpose would not have to be shown; discriminatory effect
would suffice.
Typically, a case would be made out under the discriminatory ef-
fects standard by way of statistics. Suppose, for example, a funded pro-
gram which provides adult education courses sets as a requirement the
possession of a college degree. Suppose further that the program is
challenged by a 65-year-old and an 18-year-old, both of whom have
been excluded for lack of having degrees. The plaintiffs would plead a
violation of the ADA and would allege that as a result of the degree
requirement persons under 22 and over 60 are discriminated against.
They would further allege that, as a matter of statistics, few people over
60 and under 22 have degrees. They might further allege, on informa-
tion and belief, or with specific figures if they have them, that only a
handful of the total number of persons enrolled in the program fall
within the allegedly discriminated-against age ranges-numbers con-
siderably disproportionate to the number of people in the community
of such ages.20
8
These allegations should be sufficient, absent any externally im-
posed caveats, to establish a prima facie case of a violation under the
206. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text supra.
207. Id.
208. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), the discriminatory effects test is used. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). There is some lack of clarity as to how much of an adverse impact need be shown
under Title VII. The impact must be substantial, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975), but that still leaves considerable ambiguity. A number of courts have used a guideline
prescribed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance: adverse effect occurs when the accept-
ance rate of the protected group is less than 80% of the acceptance rate of the remaining group.
See cases cited in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMArN, EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION LAW 35 n.28
(Supp. 1979). The same 4/5 rule is utilized in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures adopted to implement Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the Department of Justice, along with other federal enforcement agencies. See, e.g., 29
C.F.R. pt. 1607 (1980) (EEOC); 28 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1980) (Department of Justice).
Under Title VI, when the effects test has been used, a few courts have asserted that the impact
must be one which affects more than just a few individuals. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun.
Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D.
Fla. 1979). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 572 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), the court con-
cluded that discriminatory effect was not demonstrated under the ADA by a merely de minimis
discriminatory impact. Id. at 318.
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statute. The problem is that there is indeed just such a caveat: the
Overview to the HEW government-wide regulations asserts that the
Act does "not require proportional program participation by age or the
proportional allocation of funds by age.' ' 2°9 The rigor of this statement
is then somewhat tempered by the further assertion that "dispropor-
tionate allocation of funds or program participation may be one of the
elements which triggers an examination of whether age discrimination
exists in the federally funded program or activity.
'210
If taken literally, the Overview is extremely deleterious to the
ADA plaintiff. The classic means of establishing discriminatory effect
is to show just what the Overview discounts: disproportionate alloca-
tion of resources or disproportionate client participation. These are at
the heart of the statistically based prima facie case. To say, as the
Overview does, that disproportionality may trigger an examination of
whether age discrimination exists is irrelevant because in the courtroom
that examination will never see the light of day. The plaintiff will have
already been dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may
be granted,21' inasmuch as he will have failed to make out his prima
facie case-at least if all he alleged was the kinds of disproportionality
which the Overview addresses.
Regulations which are unreasonable may be struck down.212 Were
this discounting of disproportionality data embodied in an actual regu-
lation, it would likely meet that fate. Inasmuch as it is only the Over-
view of the regulations which raises this issue, the courts and
administrative law judges should feel free to ignore it, for to honor it
would be to drastically undercut the Act.
Once the prima facie case is established, the question then arises as
to the burdens which the plaintiff (or enforcement agency) and the de-
fendant (or respondent in an agency enforcement proceeding) carry.
The HEW government-wide regulations offer an answer as to in-
vocation of some of the statutory exceptions:
The burden of proving that an age distinction or other action
falls within the exceptions outlined in Sections 90.14 [taking age into
account as a factor necessary to the normal operation or the achieve-
ment of any statutory objective of a program or activity] and 90.15
[reliance upon a reasonable factor other than age] is on the recipient
of Federal financial assistance. 213
209. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,771 (1979).
210. Id.
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
212. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
213. 45 C.F.R. § 90.16 (1980).
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While this provision is silent as to the other exceptions embodied in the
statute and the regulations, it is only sensible to apply the same stan-
dard to them. It should be noted that this provision has been read-
notwithstanding its explicit mention of the "burden of proving"-as
leaving open the nature of the defendant's burden.
214
Case law developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964215 offers support for the conclusion that in the discriminatory
treatment setting, the funding recipient need only carry the burden of
production, absent invocation of a statutory exception, as explained in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine:216
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accom-
plish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduc-
tion of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.
The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judg-
ment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of pro-
duction, the presumption [of discrimination] raised by the prima
facie case is rebutted .... 217
Under this formulation, if applied indiscriminately, it is the plain-
tiff who, throughout the proceeding, would carry the burden of persua-
sion. Thus, once the recipient sets forth either a denial or invokes one
of the exceptions, the plaintiff (or enforcement agency) must persuade
the factfinder "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
[recipient] or. . .that the [recipient's] proffered explanation is unwor-
thy of credence.
218
As for discriminatory effects situations arising out of ostensibly
neutral policies, the Title VII case law holds that the defendant may
rebut the prima facie case by proving that "the challenged require-
ments are job related .... ,219 The plaintiff is then afforded an oppor-
tunity to show "that other selection devices without a similar
discriminatory effect would also serve the employer's legitimate interest
in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "220
Only one court has addressed the defendant's burden under the
ADA,22' doing so in the context of the plaintiffs' challenge to a policy
214. See, e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
215. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
216. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
217. Id. at 1094-95 (footnotes omitted).
218. Id. at 1095.
219. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
220. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
221. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316-17 (D. Del. 1980).
The plaintiffs argued that a planned relocation of a medical center from a central city location to
the suburbs would have the effect of discriminating against older persons, who would be less able
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neutral on its face, but allegedly discriminatory in effect. The court
asserted that the Title VII model applicable in discriminatory treat-
ment cases should apply, i e., the burden of persuasion always remains
with the plaintiff, so that "in a private cause of action . . the defend-
ant has only the burden of going forward [,]" even when an exception is
invoked.222 This conclusion, however, is not in keeping with the thrust
of the ADA, and runs counter to what the HEW regulations at least
imply, even if they do not overtly so state. In the Comment Analysis
accompanying the HEW regulations, the agency supported the burden
of proof provision thusly:
HEW believes that the recipient is best able to demonstrate that
an age distinction or factor other than age is entitled to an exception
under § 90.14 or § 90.15. The recipient (rather than the complain-
ant) is the party most knowledgeable about its program or activity,
the normal operation of the program or activity, and any statutory
objective governing the program or activity.
223
The HEW statement is an apt one. Typically, it will be the chal-
lenged program's administrator who best will know why a particular
exception arguably applies. He will have the relevant information
readily at hand, if there is any such information. It is proper, then, to
place upon the admitted age user the task of justifying that use.
224
than previously to gain access to the center's services. The plaintiffs contended that the impact, or
effects, standard should apply; the defendants argued for the intent standard. The court avoided
resolving the issue, reasoning that whichever standard were to be employed, the plaintiffs would in
any event have failed to make out a prima facie case. It then proceeded to apply the impact
standard to demonstrate that even under the test most favorable to the plaintiffs, they still would
lose. The court first assessed the elements of a prima facie case:
The impact test is, in general, characterized by a shifting burden of proof. The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving discriminatory effect. If it meets this burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to "prove" or to "articulate" a non-discriminatory justification for
the challenged actions.
* * *[Ilt is the burden of going forward with evidence which shifts, while the burden
of persuasion remains, throughout, with the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff first has both
the burden of adducing evidence of a discriminatory impact and the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of discriminatory impact . . . . If the plaintiff meets both of these
burdens, the burden shifts to the defendant to go forward with evidence showing that he
took the challenged action for a non-discriminatory reason. If he meets that burden and
can produce some evidence showing a non-discriminatory reason for the action, the bur-
den of going forward shifts back to the plaintiff who must then adduce evidence showing
that the reason is a pretext. At all times, the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff.
The nature of the justification that will serve to rebut aprimafacie case of discrimi-
nation varies according to the civil rights act which is invoked.
Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 316-17.
223. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,783 (1979).
224. Of course, one could engage in semantics, reasoning that only that which the Act outlaws
constitutes discrimination, and therefore any action in conformance with one of the statutory ex-
ceptions does not constitute discrimination. Thus, it would follow, the recipient, by invoking an
exception, has articulated a non-discriminatory reason for its action. Even were that so-and it is
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Thus, when one of the statutory exceptions is invoked by a fund-
ing recipient, it should be the burden of persuasion-not merely of go-
ing forward-which should fall upon it to prove that indeed that
exception does apply.225 The HEW government-wide regulations of
course prescribe the elements which must be established by the defend-
ant as to each exception. 226 If the recipient meets that burden, then the
burden of persuasion should shift back to the grievant to persuade the
factfinder that the recipient's proffered explanation cannot stand.
by no means obvious that this argument has merit-the fact still remains that it is the recipient
who is invoking a specific statutory standard and it is thus the recipient who best knows why that
standard properly applies. To simply allow a recipient to mouth one of the exceptions, and then
place upon the plaintiff the burden of first figuring out why the recipient thinks that exception
applies and then having to rebut its application, is to verge on giving the recipient a free ride:
Congress prescribes the magic words to articulate, and that is all the recipient need do; all the
work of demonstrating the applicability of those words is foisted upon the plaintiff or enforcement
agency.
225. The NAACP court made one further point, as to the reasonable-factors-other-than-age
exception, which is also subject to question. The court stated:
It should be noted that the Age Discrimination Act and the HEW regulations
promulgated thereunder contain no requirement that the least discriminatory alternative
be adopted. Of course, the presence of less discriminatory alternatives that would better
meet the non-age-related objective is relevant to the question of whether the discrimina-
tory action was actually taken to accomplish that objective. However, where the defend-
ant actually adduces some evidence showing that he based his action upon a non-age-
related factor that meets the criteria set out in the act and the regulations, he need not
also adduce evidence showing that his action was the least discriminatory alternative.
This interpretation is in accord with the Congressional intent to apply a lesser degree of
scrutiny to actions resulting in age discrimination than to those resulting in racial dis-
crimination. Congress intended only to prohibit "unreasonable age discrimination."
491 F. Supp. at 317 (quoting HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56) (emphasis in
original).
In terms of authority--and the court also cited to the Comment Analysis accompanying the
HEW government-wide regulations, 491 F. Supp. at 317 n.187, citing 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at
33,782-83 (1979)-the court is not accurate. While noting that in 1975 Congress sought to outlaw
"unreasonable" age discrimination, the court failed to note that in 1978 Congress amended the
ADA so as to delete the word "unreasonable" from the statute. While the full meaning of that
amendment is not elucidated by the legislative history, see text accompanying notes 66-69 supra,
the fact of its existence was deserving of note by the court.
Second, the court is accurate in observing that neither the statute nor regulations requires that
the least restrictive alternative be used, a requirement which would apply under Title VI, assum-
ing that that statute tracks the equal protection clause, since the constitutional provision has been
so construed in the context of constitutionally based race discrimination cases. See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). However, again the NAACP court sinned by omission. The HEW
regulations specify that in order for the "reasonable factors other than age" exception to apply,
"[ain action may be based on a factor other than age only if the factor bears a direct and substan-
tial relationship to the normal operation of the program or activity or to the achievement of a
statutory objective." 45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1980) (emphasis added). Thus, if a factor other than age
only indirectly or insubstantially relates to the normal operation of a program, the statutory ex-
ception does not hold. While imposing upon a funding recipient the requirement of showing that
his use of such a factor bears a direct and substantial relationship is less rigorous than the imposi-
tion of a showing that his action was the least restrictive alternative, that imposition is at the same
time one which is more demanding than a mere showing of a rational relationship and one, again,
which should have been noted by the court.
226. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.3, 90.14, 90.15, 90.49(b), 90.49(c) (1980).
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Application of Equal Protection and Title VI Standards
to the ADA-The Better Course
Since Congress avowedly modeled the ADA on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,227 the latter statute provides a powerful anal-
ogy. It does not necessarily follow, however, that as to the issue of
making out a prima facie case, the two statutes need be, or should be,
read in tandem. Even if Title VI is read as requiring a showing of
discriminatory intent, there are both persuasive legal and policy argu-
ments disputing the need to read the ADA as embodying a like require-
ment.
Two primary arguments favor equating the two statutes. First,
there is the matter of legislative history: Congress, in drafting and
passing the ADA, looked to Title VI as its model. Second, there is an
arguable policy basis for making the equation. There can be no ques-
tion that Congress viewed age discrimination as a vice less pernicious
than race discrimination; the exceptions embodied in the ADA reveal
that at least in some circumstances Congress was willing to tolerate
ageism, whereas Title Vi, addressing race discrimination, allows for no
caveats. In the conference report accompanying the 1975 bill which
became law, 228 Congress indeed stated that it viewed age discrimina-
tion as a lesser evil. It could be considered anomalous, given this per-
ception of comparative evils, to read Title VI as requiring a standard-
discriminatory purpose-making the task of an aggrieved plaintiff par-
ticularly difficult in the race discrimination context, and at the same
time to read the ADA, aimed at a lesser evil, as embodying a standard
whereby the claimed victim of ageism has a much easier task of setting
out a viable prima facie claim.
Several factors cut against the Title VI-ADA equation, however.
First, the very existence of a number of significant statutorily pre-
scribed exceptions to the ADA's ban on age discrimination shows that
the Title VI-ADA equation is far from a perfect one, given that Title
VI itself embodies no such exceptions to its proscription on race dis-
crimination. The ADA is not a virtual clone of its predecessor, and
thus the interpretations of Title VI, while useful, are by no means nec-
essarily determinative. More than that, these exceptions in the ADA
can be understood as expressing Congress' willingness to impose cer-
tain barriers to a plaintiff obtaining relief under the Act, and at the
same time Congress' intent to exclude all other barriers. Given the
227. See, e.g., HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 56.
228. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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drastic remedy of funding termination, protection for the defendant
against too easy an application of the remedy is understandably
needed. This is particularly so under Title VI since, if the plaintiff suc-
cessfully makes out his prima facie case, the defendant presumably will
then face a particularly difficult burden, i e., proving that its racial dis-
tinction serves a compelling interest, and that that distinction is the nar-
rowest means possible to achieve that interest.229 Imposition of the
discriminatory purpose standard affords the necessary initial protection
to the Title VI defendant. The statutory exceptions in the ADA serve a
like role as the source of defendant protection and no more protection
is needed. This is particularly so inasmuch as the defendant in an
ADA action will have an easier task of avoiding liability, since once a
prima facie case is made out, it will not have to prove that it has a
compelling interest for its age use, and that such use of an age distinc-
tion is the least restrictive alternative. Rather, it will only have to prove
the applicability of one of the numerous elastic exceptions.
Second, there is the matter of the interpretation given the statute in
the HEW government-wide regulations, although admittedly that inter-
pretation is not altogether clear. In stating the "Rules Against Age Dis-
crimination, ' 230 the regulations assert that a funding recipient may not,
save if it acts in accordance with the regulations implementing the pri-
mary statutory exceptions, "use age distinctions or take any other ac-
tions which have the effect, on the basis of age," of excluding persons,
denying them benefits, etc.2 3 1 Considerable judicial deference is ac-
corded intepretations given to a statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration and interpretation; these interpretations
are to be followed unless unreasonable. 232 Thus, the fact that HEW
229. This burden on the defendant follows from incorporating equal protection standards into
Title VI, since these standards are established in the equal protection-based race discrimination
decisions of the Supreme Court, with which Title VI has been equated. See, e.g., Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But see Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court
indicated that the defendant in a Title VI case might not have to show that its challenged action
was the best alternative.
230. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
231. 45 C.F.R. § 90.12(b) (1980) (emphasis added). This caveat--sanctioning age distinctions
which have the effect of excluding persons, but only when such distinctions are made pursuant to
one of the statutory exceptions, as interpreted by the regulations-is reaffirmed as to the "reason-
able factors other than age" exception by the regulatory provision addressing that exception: "A
recipient is permitted to take an action otherwise prohibited by section 90.12 [iZe., the 'rules
against age discrimination'] which is based on a factor other than age, even though that action
may have a disproportionate effect on persons of different ages." 45 C.F.R. § 90.15 (1980).
232. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-67 (1980); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Of course, the bottom line is that "no agency may lawfully adopt a standard
by regulation that squarely conflicts with the standard which has been adopted by Congress or
authoritatively legislated by the courts." Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 234 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd,
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opted for the effects test is persuasive.233
There is a third basis for disputing the equal protection-Title VI
analogy. Under Title VI, once a prima facie case is made out, the bur-
den presumably shifts to the defendant to establish that it has a com-
pelling interest for its racial distinction, and that that distinction is the
least restrictive means to achieve that interest.23 4 This follows, as al-
ready noted, from the fact that a similar formula has been constructed
in the equal protection race discrimination decisions. Since the ADA
does not deal with race-a suspect classification under the Consti-
tution-but rather with age, only a minimum rationality test would
apply, entailing extreme deference to the challenged decisionmaker.
235
This is a test which is virtually outcome-predictive, dooming the plain-
tiff in likely every instance to defeat. 236 An aspect of this approach,
moreover, is that the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant to
prove rationality; rather, it remains with the plaintiff to prove irration-
ality.
-The language and history of the ADA and its regulations belie
such a result being tolerable. So does common sense. If the total up-
shot of the Act were simply that if a funding recipient failed to meet the
somewhat onerous burden of proving the applicability of an exception,
it would then fall upon the plaintiff or enforcement agency to prove the
age distinction's irrationality, the Act would prove to be a cipher. A
charged recipient would be better off not invoking any exception, and
thus the exceptions would effectively mean nothing in practice.
627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, if indeed the equal protection standard is incorporated in Title
VI, and if the ADA must follow that course, the regulations cannot overcome this train of legal
logic.
233. Admittedly, HEW itself muddied the waters somewhat by asserting in the Overview to
the regulations that "proportional program participation by age or the proportional allocation of
funds by age" is not required under the Act, although it did acknowledge that disproportionality
"may be one of the elements which triggers an examination of whether age discrimination exists."
44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, at 33,771 (1979). Thus, a showing of at least one type of discriminatory
impact-the structuring of a program in terms of funding or client participation in such a way that
it underserves a given age group-possibly does not suffice to make out a prima facie violation of
the Act. But see text accompanying notes 211-12 supra.
It should also be noted that HEW's regulation interpreting Title VI as embodying an effects
standard, while persuasive in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), see text accompanying notes
172-75 supra, was apparently not sufficient-at least for five Justices in University of Cal. Bd. of
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352 (1978), and all nine in Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979)-to override the constitutionally based reading of Title VI importing into the statute the
discriminatory purpose standard. See notes 176-85 and accompanying text supra.
234. But see Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), indicating that the defendant would
not be required to demonstrate that the challenged action was the best alternative.
235. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
236. See id. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The history of the Act further confirms that the equal protection-
Title VI analogy which would ultimately lead to the mere rationality
test applying under the ADA is inappropriate. In 1978 Congress
amended the Act, deleting the word "unreasonable" from the statement
of purpose.2 37 While the legislative history as to this change is unen-
lightening, 238 the impetus for the amendment must have been to make
clear that if a funding recipient could not successfully invoke one of the
exceptions, it would stand in violation of the Act. In other words, dele-
tion of "unreasonable" established that the recipient would not and
could not still have the opportunity to prevail just as long as its alleged
wrong was rational.239 And yet, were the ADA to be equated with the
equal protection clause insofar as making out a prima facie case is con-
cerned, the mere rationality test indeed would apply, thereby undercut-
ting Congress' 1978 effort.
Thus far there is no certain answer to the ADA impact-intent
question. Only one court has been called upon to address the issue,
and it avoided providing an answer, reasoning that regardless of which
test were to be used under the ADA, the plaintiff would lose in any
event and thus it did not have to definitively rule as to which test
should apply as a matter of law.24° Moreover, added ambiguity is gen-
erated by the fact that a constitutionally derived test may be appropri-
ate for dealing with governmental defendants, while not necessarily
appropriate, or even dictated by the Title VI analogy, for private de-
237. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
238. Id.
239. Clearly Congress has the authority to outlaw actions by a statute employing a lesser de-
fendant-protective standard--e.g., the effects test-than the Court has read into the equal protec-
tion clause. Congress has done so under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as interpreted by the Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Title VII has been read as an exercise of Congress' commerce
power embodied in article I, § 8 of the Constitution. The ADA is an exercise of Congress' spend-
ing power, embodied in the same constitutional provision. That distinction is not significant, how-
ever. Congress may impose conditions on the moneys it appropriates, as long as such conditions
do not contravene any specific provision of the Constitution, and as long as such conditions are
rational. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). Clearly, neither
the ADA nor the ADA implemented by use of an effects standard violates any other provision of
the Constitution, nor is the rationality requirement offended.
Even were the ADA to be read as an exercise of the Congress' fourteenth amendment en-
forcement authority to implement the equal protection clause under § 5 of that amendment, there
is strong basis for upholding a discriminatory effects interpretation, notwithstanding that the equal
protection clause itself embodies a discriminatory purpose standard. See Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Burger, C.J., with whom White and Powell, JJ., join). Cf. City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), where the Court held that even if the fifteenth amendment
only banned purposeful discrimination, Congress could-pursuant to its enforcement powers
under the amendment-render unlawful by statute acts which merely had a discriminatory effect.
240. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980).
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fendants. 241
As a matter of optimum interpretation, the effects standard should
apply both to governmental and private recipients of federal funding.
Given that the ADA is a civil rights statute, clearly designed to provide
relief to victims of what Congress perceived as a wrongful form of dis-
crimination, the statute should be construed in that manner which fa-
cilitates, rather than inhibits, redress.242 To read the ADA as imposing
the plaintiff-protective standard of discriminatory effect as being suffi-
cient to make out a prima facie case accords with that thrust. It also
accords with the language of the statute. Moreover, it does not unduly
prejudice defendants since they have available to them a number of
statutory and regulatory exceptions to the Act's prohibition.
CONCLUSION
There are both global and specific problems generated by the Age
Discrimination Act. The basic problem which permeates the statute-
as revealed by its history and its language-is the Congress' inability to
come to grips with just what it was that it wanted to proscribe. "Age
discrimination" is an easy rallying cry; the tough task is translating a
condemnation of the vice into workable, intelligible legislative lan-
guage. Congress, unable to master this effort, first looked to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights to resolve its conceptual difficulties,
and then to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Given
the problems with the statute itself, it was hardly surprising that these
two agencies were unable to achieve a satisfactory resolution.
At more discrete levels, there are a variety of issues which arise
under the Act, concerning such matters as the problem of establishing a
prima facie case, of countenancing affirmative action and special bene-
fits, of pinpointing violators of the statute, etc. The unifying idea which
should be applied in addressing these issues is that which follows from
the nature of the statute: by design it is a remedial piece of legislation,
aimed at securing relief for individuals from discrimination. Thus, it
should be interpreted in a manner to further this end, rather than re-
strictively so as to curtail or negate attacks on ageism.
Ultimately, Congress must wrestle with the matter of ageism
again. The ADA is simply too flawed to be allowed to stand as the
final legislative word. Congress must collect, in the first instance, the
241. See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
242. Cf. Sanches v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Beck v. Borough of
Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (civil rights statutes to be liberally construed).
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data to determine the extent of discrimination. Assuming the data ex-
ists-and there are of course significant problems just in designing the
methodology for that determination-Congress must then decide who
it really wants to help. Perhaps the best tack would be to single out that
group typically thought of as being the most common victims of age
discrimination-the elderly-and limit the statute to their protection.
That, at least, would resolve some of the difficulties inherent in a stat-
ute which, as it is now written, applies to all age groups.
Most importantly, Congress must renew examination of the perni-
ciousness of age discrimination. When the ADA was passed, Congress
did not think it a very significant problem in terms of invidiousness.
Congress was wrong: denial or deprivation on the basis of age has very
little redeeming merit, at least in those instances where the imposed
disadvantage follows from the individual being too old and thus flows
from a condition which he may never escape. 243 But even if Congress
was correct, as a general matter, in placing ageism below racism and
sexism in the list of societal evils, the ADA simply does too little to
address the evil that it did perceive to exist.
Perhaps Congress may, upon reexamination, conclude that ageism
perpetrated by recipients of federal financial assistance is, after all, a
vice of such limited dimensions that no statutory condemnation is even
warranted. At least, should that ensue, a now-flawed statute, born of
obviously confused legislators, would no longer stand as a lightning rod
for false hopes. If, to the contrary, Congress properly captures in legis-
lation a coherent proscription of discrimination, it will have advanced a
cause as yet unfulfilled.
243. See generally Eglit, supra note 84.
